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ABSTRACT 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE BARRIERS TO THE ASSIMILATION OF 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
BY 
 
JENNIFER LEIGH FRIES 
 
April 2011 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Daniel C. Bello 
 
Major Academic Unit: Marketing 
 
 
Organizations are increasingly focusing on their value chain activities in an effort to 
improve their performance, especially in the recent economic times.  Improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their channel activities has become a focal point for many 
organizations.  Interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have played an important part in this 
effort.  While in theory, IOS’s have the ability to enhance the degree of cooperation and 
coordination between two channel partners, often the results obtained are not what is 
expected.  Hence, it becomes very important to understand the barriers to the assimilation 
of these technologies.  Drawing upon theoretical perspectives of governance, including 
transaction cost analysis (TCA), control theory and agency theory, we develop an 
integrative model that examines the factors that influence an organizations assimilation 
process.  The model identifies and examines three stages of assimilation: technological, 
exploitive and explorative assimilation that add value to an organization.  The model 
features asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance documentation, agent 
orientation and bilateral governance mechanisms as antecedents to assimilation.  It also 
examines the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms. 
 
Our results suggest that theories of governance provide an additional lens to examine 
assimilation phenomena.  In specific, our empirical analysis leads to several key findings: 
(1) channel partners who are locked in to the relationship with high levels of asset 
specificity are more likely to assimilate the technology; (2)  bilateral governance 
mechanisms are a key force in the assimilation process, with both direct and moderated 
effects; (3) organizations that view the channel partner as an agent of the firm are less 
likely to adopt the technology, especially when the relationship exhibits low levels of 
bilateral governance mechanisms.  Together these findings provide new insights into 
barriers to the assimilation of IOS’s in channel relationships. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the last four decades, interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have become increasingly 
important in channel partner relationships.  An IOS can be defined as an information technology 
system that links two or more organization’s business processes together in such a way that 
information is automatically distributed between channel partners (Grover 1993; Johnston and 
Vitale 1988; Robey, Im and Wareham 2008).  An IOS is designed to support collaboration and 
cooperation between channel partners (Volkoff, Chan and Newson 1999).  These systems 
include hardware, software, network facilities, procedures, rules, databases and knowledge 
exchange between two or more organizations (Hausman, Johnston and Oyedel 2005).   
 
IOS’s enhance the degree of cooperation and coordination between two channel partners and 
include such technologies as electronic data interchange (EDI), supply chain management 
systems, electronic commerce and most recently Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technologies (Curtin, Kauffman and Riggins 2007).  These technologies are often mandated by 
one channel partner, who makes the adoption of the technology a mandatory requirement for 
their channel partner to continue the exchange relationship.  While power plays a significant role 
in channel partner IOS, it is not the holy grail, as Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, has 
learned from its faltering RFID-based IOS mandates that began in 2003.  Although the RFID 
mandates have not progressed as originally planned, the importance of these systems is 
highlighted by Wal-Mart’s recent strategy to increase its direct-from-manufacturer purchases 
from 20% to 80% of all goods purchased (Birchall 2010), which emphasizes the need for 
efficient supply chain management. 
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The main reason channel partners are motivated to implement IOS’s is their desire to create 
additional economic value through the creation of more effective and efficient 
interorganizational interactions (Buvik and John 2000; Kumar and van Dissel 1996; Wilson and 
Vlosky 1998).  Economic value is created through the channel partners’ investments in specific 
assets, increased knowledge exchange, the combining of complementary resources and lowered 
transaction costs (Dyer and Singh 1998).  While economic value is the goal of the IOS 
implementation process, it is not a guaranteed outcome, mainly due to the interdependencies of 
performance outcomes that are created by the implementation process (Son, Narasimhan and 
Riggins 2005).   
 
With an IOS, neither of the channel partners can optimize the benefits of the technology unless 
both channel partners assimilate the technological components and reengineer business 
processes.  The adoption and assimilation of an IOS is the result of a complex and iterative 
process of negotiations, commitments and executions of those commitments (Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994).  It begins with one trading partner’s decision to adopt the technology; this partner 
may be the supplier or the retailer, and as such they can be considered the initiator. Those 
channel partners who participate in the adoption are considered followers.  With the most recent 
RFID-based IOS projects, in almost all cases the initiator has been the retailer and the supplier 
has been the follower.   
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IOS projects carry more risk than internal technology applications for both the initiator and 
follower because of the reliance on and lack of control over the trading partner’s behaviors.  In 
order for the value to be derived from an IOS, both channel partners must adopt and utilize the 
technology.  This becomes problematic for the organization initiating the technological 
enhancement due to the fact that they often have little control over the adoption behaviors of 
their partner organization’s and hence limited control in realizing benefits from the technology 
(Bello, Lohtia, and Sangtani 2004).     
 
The need to understand the adoption behavior of follower’s is especially crucial as major 
retailers, including Wal-mart, Macy’s and JC Penney, and governments attempt to mandate the  
adoption and utilization of  RFID-based IOS’s.  Considering that blanketed mandates, where all 
suppliers are given assimilation deadlines or face penalties, have been ineffective in accelerating 
the diffusion of the technology, it becomes important to understand what drives the assimilation 
process.  Mandates are an excise of power and give followers no choice in the matter of adoption 
unless they are willing to terminate the relationship and lose the sales revenue generated from the 
exchange relationship.  Nevertheless, the scalability of the RFID-based IOS allows followers to 
choose the degree to which they will adopt the physical components of the technology, ranging 
from low level implementation of solely the tags, to higher level implementations that include 
the software, hardware and enterprise exchange components that allow the free flow of 
information between the channel partners.  As a result, the degree of assimilation has varied 
greatly across followers.  Considering that neither partner can realize the benefits of the RFID 
system if the follower doesn’t assimilate and utilize the technology, understanding the variation 
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in the assimilation of followers becomes key to understanding how and why interorganizational 
systems succeed.  
 
The extant research surrounding IOS adoption and assimilation suggests some rationales for the 
variation in the assimilation.  In particular, three main categories of antecedents have been shown 
to influence assimilation: characteristics of the technology, organization and exchange.  The first 
stream focuses on the characteristics of the technology, and suggests that the difficulty associated 
with adopting and assimilating IOS’s can be attributed to the perceived relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter 2001; 
Iacovou, Benbasat and Dexter 1995; O’Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski 1992; Rogers 
2003).  While this has been the predominate paradigm for analyzing IOS adoption and use, 
researchers suggest that technological characteristics alone are limited in their ability to explain 
the variance in adoption and assimilation processes (Attewell 1992).  The major argument is that 
innovation theory only considers knowledge about the technology and ignores the implications 
of knowing how to implement and use the technology (Attewell 1992; Fichman and Kemerer 
1997).    
 
A second stream of research, which focuses on the characteristics of the organization, represents 
the follower’s ability to adopt and implement an IOS.   This stream of research suggests that each 
organization has a unique endowment of resources that impact its ability to adopt and implement 
IOS’s (Kim, Cavusgil and Calantone 2006; Fichman and Kemerer 1997; Piccoli and Ives 2005).  
Researchers rely on various theoretical foundations and several “middle-range” theories to 
explain the relationship between organizational characteristics and IOS adoption and 
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implementation behaviors.  Although this stream of research is prolific, some authors suggest 
that the theoretical diversity threatens the legitimacy of the research (Benbasat and Zmud 2003).  
 
The third stream of research utilizes characteristics of the exchange to examine the willingness of 
a follower to adopt and implement an IOS with the initiator. Considering that an IOS represents a 
mechanism for two organizations to vertically coordinate, and vertical coordination is a hybrid 
form of governance, there were very few articles that examined how the characteristics of the 
exchange influence the extent to which the follower will vertically coordinate through the 
adoption and implementation of an IOS (Buvik and John 2000).   While there were several 
studies that examine the influence of dependence, trust, and power (Hart and Saunders 1998; 
Hausman and Stock 2003; Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995; Wu, Mahajan and 
Balasubramanian 2003), there were only a few studies that examined how elements of the 
exchange relationship would influence the follower’s willingness to adopt and implement the 
technology.  Additionally, attention has been paid to the positive influence of specific assets 
(Bala and Venkatesh 2007; Corsten and Kumar 2005; Zaheer, and Venkatraman 1994), but little 
has been written to explain how technological uncertainty and performance ambiguity impact the 
assimilation process.   
 
Though researchers have formulated a general understanding of the assimilation of IOS’s, there 
is a need for a richer understanding of the process and its drivers.  Traditional models of 
diffusion suggest that time and technological characteristics are the greatest predictors of 
adoption behaviors (Rogers 2003).  However, in mandated situations followers do not have the 
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choice to adopt; rather, their choice is whether or not they should retain the business relationship.  
Their decision becomes one of channel efficiency.   
 
Essentially, the decision the follower is making is one of acquiescing or not acquiescing to the 
new mode of governance that the technology imposes on the exchange relationship.  With RFID-
based IOS’s, the technology can provide bilateral behavioral monitoring capabilities for both 
channel partners. The extent of this monitoring capability is highly dependent on the level of 
RFID component implementation, and while visibility increases with the installation of the 
readers, middleware, hardware, and enterprise exchange systems, the level of tagging has the 
greatest impact.  Initial mandates required tagging at the case and pallet level; however, item 
level tagging provides the most granular visibility and has been demonstrated to provide 
significant improvements in various supply chain activities (Delen, Hardgrave and Sharda 2007).  
At this level, individual items can be tracked at a distance using radio waves, providing real time 
tracking of each product as it passes through the supply chain.  RFID-based IOS’s provide 
newfound visibility into such activities and tasks as stock rotation, out-of-stock management, 
reverse logistics management, as well as enhanced visibility for monitoring delivery 
verifications, chargebacks and promotional activities. The increase in visibility that the 
technology provides represents a change in the structure of the relationship, and as such the 
decision to implement the technology becomes more of a governance decision and less of an 
adoption decision.  As such, theories of efficient contracting, with contracting defined in the 
broad sense provided by Heide (1994), can be applied to the phenomena of the assimilation of 
IOS’s. 
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Three theories of governance, control theory, agency theory and transaction costs analysis, can 
provide additional theoretical lenses that might further explain the assimilation of IOS’s.  It can 
be argued that the implementation of an IOS represents the “purposive organization of activities 
and information flows between independent organizations,” (Buvik and John 2000), or in simpler 
terms a mechanism that enables vertical coordination between channel partners (Buvik and John 
2000; Grover and Saeed 2007; Kumar and van Dissel 1996; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).  
This suggests that the IOS represents a governance structure.  The degree of implementation, 
which varies across organizations, determines the level of governance that exists within the 
relationship.  Under this logic, the assimilation of an IOS is similar to joint action in that it is a 
hybrid governance structure (Heide 1994).  Following the logic of Jaworski (1988) and Jaworski 
and MacInnis (1989), the IOS can be seen as a formal control mechanism designed to “increase 
the probability that specified plans are implemented properly and desired outcomes are 
achieved”.  Implementation of the IOS represents a behavior-oriented contract between the 
channel partners (Eisenhardt 1989).  The two complementary theories suggest that the 
assimilation of the IOS will be dependent on elements of the exchange relationship.   
 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
In the adoption literature, researchers have suggested that acquiring the physical components of 
the technology does not lead to deployment and use (Fichman and Kemerer 1999), indicating 
that there is a distinction between the decision to purchase the technology and the assimilation 
activities (Rogers 2003).  This research will examine the deployment and utilization of 
interorganizational technologies, in the context of RFID systems, which has been referred to as 
assimilation (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  RFID-based IOS systems were selected as the 
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context due to relative newness of the technology applications in the retail setting.  The 
overarching objectives of this research are to (1) create a mediated measure of assimilation, (2) 
understand the relational drivers of assimilation, (3) provide a theoretical framework for 
examining the influence of the characteristics of the exchange relationship, and (4) determine 
how bilateral governance mechanisms moderate the relationship between characteristics 
exchange relationship and assimilation. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY 
 
The model of interorganizational RFID assimilation within channel relationships provides new 
insight into the phenomena of IOS assimilation.  First, this new perspective on RFID assimilation 
contributes to the assimilation stream of literature by providing a higher-order measure of IOS 
assimilation. Second, we provide a theoretical framework for examining the relationship between 
exchange relationship characteristics and assimilation.  Third, we examine how bilateral 
governance mechanisms differentially influence the relationship between characteristics of the 
exchange and assimilation.   
 
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 
This manuscript is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review 
on the topics of assimilation and governance mechanisms. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual 
model, conceptualizations of the constructs and corresponding hypothesis.  Chapter 4 discusses 
the research design and methodology, as well as how each construct will be measured and data 
collection procedures. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the analyses.  Finally, Chapter 6 
17 
 
provides the discussion of key contributions, theoretical implications, study limitations and 
directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This study focuses on specific characteristics that explain the propensity to assimilate a 
mandated IOS.  The objective is to examine several major theories that motivate and substantiate 
the conceptual model proposed in this study.  We review the dominant theories in adoption and 
assimilation and then examine relevant theories of governance.   
 
A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ON ASSIMILATION  
Innovation Theory 
 
In a review of empirical research surrounding IOS’s, Robey, Im and Wareham (2008), found that 
the majority of the studies rely upon Rogers’ (2003) diffusion of innovation theory.  Under this 
theoretical lens, innovation is defined as an “idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by 
an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003).  Adoption occurs as a sequence of events 
beginning with awareness of the technology, followed by attitude formation, then a decision to 
adopt or reject the technology, and followed by the implementation of the technology (Rogers 
2003).  Five characteristics of the innovation have been identified as the key to understanding the 
variance observed in adoption behaviors (Rogers 2003).  Relative advantage describes the degree 
to which an adopter perceives that the innovation is better than the idea it will replace (Rogers 
2003).  Compatibility represents the congruence between the innovation and the existing values, 
experience and needs of the adopter.  Complexity is the difficulty associated with understanding 
and using the technology.  Trialability is the extent to which the innovation can be experimented 
with on a trial basis (Rogers 2003).  And finally, observability is the extent to which the adopter 
can observe the results that other have had with the innovation.   
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Of the five characteristics that influence adoption, relative advantage, compatibility and 
complexity have the most theoretical evidence supporting their role in explaining IOS adoption.  
Research indicates that the more an organization perceives the IOS as having benefits exceeding 
the current legacy system, the more likely they are to adopt (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter 
2001; Iacovou, Benbasat and Dexter 1995; O’Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski 1992).  In 
regards to complexity, research suggests that the harder the IOS is to understand and use, the 
lower the likelihood that the organization will adopt or implement the IOS (Grover 1993; Grover 
and Saeed 2007).  Research on compatibility suggests that the more consistent the IOS is with 
existing organization values, experience and needs, the more likely it will be adopted and 
internally and externally diffused (Grover 1993; O’Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski 1992; 
Ramamurthy and Premkumar 1995). 
 
Assimilation Framework 
 
Similar to Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory, the assimilation framework is also concerned 
with the mechanisms that drive adoption, although they suggest a far different rational and the 
drivers are not as clearly specified.  Attewell (1992) introduces the framework and suggests that 
the classical diffusion models are less applicable when dealing with complex technologies due to 
the fact that it does not consider the abilities of the adopting organizations.  Complex 
technologies create knowledge barriers for organization that have limited technical knowledge 
and know-how which impacts their ability to adopt and implement technologies (Attewell 1992).   
The assimilation framework suggests that knowledge barriers are created when organizational 
resources are insufficient to the extent that they place burdens on organizational learning 
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(Attewell 1992; Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  Organizations are less susceptible to knowledge 
barriers when they have resources that encourage organizational learning (Fichman and Kemerer 
1997).   
 
Similar to adoption, assimilation of a technology is a process that begins with an organizations 
awareness of the technology.  Once they are aware of the technology and show an interest in its 
applications, the organization will evaluate the technology, and then decide to deploy the 
technology within the organization, which is followed by limited then full deployment (Fichman 
and Kemerer 1997).  In regards to IOS’s, assimilation has been conceptualized and 
operationalized in many different manners. Several researchers define assimilation as a process 
beginning with the awareness of the technology and ending with its deployment (Fichman and 
Kemerer 1997; Rai, Patnayakuni and Patnayakuni 2008).  Bala and Venkatesh (2007) define IOS 
assimilation as the extent to which the IOS can sustain and facilitate relevant business activities 
that become widely deployed and routinized in an organization. Another conceptualization 
focuses on the extent of use and the routinization of the use across the organization (Purvis, 
Sambamurthy and Zmud 2001).   
 
In the assimilation literature, the driver’s of assimilation have been defined in terms of 
organizational resources.  These resources must reach a state where the technology can be used 
effectively (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  The gap between the current state of resources and the 
resources necessary for the assimilation of the technology vary across organizations depending 
on the extent which the resources burden organizational learning (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  
The literature identifies several resources that burden organizational learning.  Fichman and 
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Kemerer (1997) find that the less prior knowledge related to the technology and the less diversity 
of knowledge within an organization the less likely the organization is to initiate and sustain the 
assimilation of the technology.  In this case, when an organization has less prior knowledge it 
will be harder to acquire new knowledge and more knowledge must be acquired, resulting in a 
large knowledge burden for the organization.  Similarly, diversity of knowledge represents an 
organization’s ability to relate new information to what is already known (Fichman and Kemerer 
1997).  Research finds that the less diverse the organization’s knowledge, the lower their ability 
to assimilate (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  Several studies have found that IT infrastructure 
will positively influence assimilation (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Rai et al. 2006).  IT 
infrastructure capabilities represent the gap between the existing IT infrastructure and the 
infrastructure changes required for the new technology.  A large gap between the existing 
infrastructure and the new infrastructure places a burden on organization learning in that it 
requires that the organization understand new technical features and specifications.  
 
A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 
As stated by Heide (1994), “governance is a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the 
initiation, termination and ongoing relationship maintenance between sets of parties.”  It includes 
the structuring, monitoring and enforcement of exchange relationships and subsumes issues of 
channel control (Heide 1994).  Three theories germane to channel governance are control theory, 
agency theory and transaction cost analysis because they suggest what elements of the 
transaction relationship encourage or discourage the implementation and use of RFID-based 
IOS’s.  While control and agency theories have been utilized primarily in the examination of 
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intraorganizational relationships, some researchers have extrapolated the theories to understand 
independent channel relationships (Celly and Frazier 1996; Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010).   
In essence, the assimilation of the RFID-based IOS represents a decision on the part of the 
principal (the supplier) to implement a control system that monitors the agent’s (the retailer’s) 
outcomes and behaviors.  A high level of assimilation corresponds to a behavioral-control system 
that monitors the processes of the agent.  Assimilation at low levels represents a decision to 
utilize outcome-based control systems.  Each of these theories suggests conditions under which 
each system is most suitable.  Each theory approaches the assimilation problem with different 
assumptions and different antecedent variables.  As such, it is beneficial to examine the 
phenomena under these three lenses.  In the following section we compare and integrate the three 
theories as they pertain to the assimilation of IOS’s. 
 
Control Theory 
 
Control refers to an organization’s attempts to influence their channel partners behaviors and 
activities to achieve desired goals (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988; Jaworksi and 
MacInnis 1989; Jaworksi Stathakipoulos and Krishnan 1993).  The procedures that the 
organization uses to monitor, evaluate, manage and influence its channel partner during the 
lifetime of the exchange are considered the organization’s control system (Anderson and Oliver 
1987).  These controls are vital to the efficiency of the channel because they influence member 
behavior, ideally in a way that enhances value for both channel partners (Anderson and Oliver 
1987; Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010).   Formal, or unilateral controls, and informal 
controls, or bilateral controls, exist within the channel relationship and may operate in solitude or 
tandem (Jaworski 1988; Jaworski, Stathakopoulos and Krishnan 1993).   
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Research suggests formal control is executed through two alternative strategies: outcome control 
and behavior control (Eisenhardt 1985; Jaworski 1988; Jaworksi and MacInnis 1989; Joshi 
2009).  Outcome controls represent a minimalistic approach to governing the channel.  With 
outcome-based control systems the focus is on the straightforward measure of results, such as 
sales volume and dollars (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988).  With these systems very 
little monitoring and direction is provided to the channel partner.  Historically, organizations rely 
on outcome-based control systems when behaviors are difficult to measure (Oliver and Anderson 
1994).  In contrast, behavior controls utilize extensive performance monitoring to direct channel 
activities that are expected to achieve channel goals (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Oliver and 
Anderson 1994).  With these strategies, channel processes (e.g., channel activities such as 
execution of promotions, stock rotation, etc.), are monitored and directed.  While the behaviors 
associated with the channel processes are not direct indicators of the outputs they are expected to 
have a strong influence on performance (Oliver and Anderson 1994).   
 
To the extent that formal mechanisms cannot specify and manage all contingencies in a 
relationship, bilateral control, which utilize joint action of the exchange partners, can be enacted 
(Bello and Gilliland 2002; Heide 1994; Jaworski 1988). Based on the social elements of the 
relationship, bilateral governance mechanisms rely on the collaborative efforts of both channel 
partners to achieve mutual goals (Heide 1994).  Bilateral mechanisms parallel formal controls, in 
that they are used to incentivize, monitor and enforce acceptable channel behaviors.  However 
they evince themselves in less formal, more relationally based way.  Bilateral incentives are 
based on expectations of fairness over the long-run, even when faced with short term sacrifices 
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(Dyer and Singh 1998; Heide 1994).  Outcome behaviors are motivated and managed by the 
expectation that the relationship will continue into the future and equity will prevail (Heide 
1994).  Under bilateral governance, monitoring processes are self-enforced and based on the 
each organization’s examination of their own investments in light of channel partner 
expectations (Heide 1994).  Enforcement is based on social norms, where aspects of the 
relationship, such as trust and commitment, are relied upon as mechanisms to impose the 
informal rules of the relationship (Heide 1994).  While there is limited research examining 
informal controls, it suggests that bilateral mechanisms positively effect coordination and 
negatively impact conflict (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010).   
 
While there is a significant amount of research examining the consequences of control strategies 
(see Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy 2005 for a review), research regarding the antecedents is 
scarce.  Jaworski (1988) suggests that the decision to implement outcome-based control 
strategies or behavior-based control strategies is dependent on the macro, operating and internal 
environments.  Limited research suggests that the environmental variables of uncertainty as well 
as the company variables of measurability outcome, and routinization are positively related to the 
use of behavior-based controls (Krafft 1999).  Eisenhardt (1985) extrapolates on the influence of 
the internal environment and finds that the task characteristics influence the choice of control 
strategies.  In particular she finds that task programmability, which is the degree to which 
behaviors can be defined and measured, lends itself to output controls when goals can be clearly 
stated and measured.  Additional research examines the concept of task characteristics and finds 
that procedural knowledge, performance documentation lead to the decision to employ outcome-
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controls (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1993; Jaworski and MacInnis 1989; Jaworski, 
Stathaltopoulos and Krishnan 1993; Ramaswami 2002). 
 
In summary, if RFID-based IOS’s are viewed from the perspective of being a mechanism that 
enables behavioral-based control, then control theory would suggest the rational for the decision 
to assimilate or not assimilate the technology.  The theory suggests that internal and external 
environmental factors influence the decision to assimilate, with characteristics of the task having 
the most empirical support.  
Agency Theory 
Research surrounding agency theory has been vast in the areas of marketing, economics, finance 
organizational behavior.  This is not surprising considering that the agency relationship exists in 
almost all exchange relationships (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992).  In specific, agency theory 
encompasses any relationship where one party (the principal) attempts to control the activities of 
another party (the agent) to whom the principal has delegated channel activities (Bahli and 
Rivard 2003; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1985).  The theory suggests that 
execution of these actions represent a contract between the two parties, which may exist as either 
formal, explicit contracts or informal “social contracts” (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; 
Eisenhardt 1985).  Determining which type of contracting option is most efficient is the focus of 
the theory. The most efficient contract is the decision of the principal and does not guarantee 
joint utility maximization for both channel partners.   
 
Two types of agency problems, precontractual and postcontractual, have been identified.  
Precontractual problems exist during the initiation stage of an exchange relationship and deal 
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with the hazards associated with selecting an exchange partner (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; 
Eisenhardt 1989).    Postcontractual problems manifest themselves during the relationship and 
are related to the risks associated with goal incongruency between the principal and agent 
(Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1989).  Considering that the decision to participate 
in an IOS occurs within an existing principal/agent relationship we will focus on the 
postcontractual problem.  
 
 
Bergen, Dutta and Walker (1992) refer to postcontractual problems as those of “hidden action” 
which involve four main assumptions regarding the principal/agent relationship.  First, both are 
motivated by self-interest, which suggests that the relationship has some degree of goal 
incongruence (Anderson and Oliver 1987).  Second, the principal has some degree of ambiguity 
regarding the actions performed for the principal by the agent (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; 
Eisenhardt 1989).  The third assumption considers that uncontrollable environmental factors 
make it difficult to contract for all contingencies (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992).  Finally, the 
agent and principal are expected to have differing risk preferences (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 
1992).   
 
The assumptions suggest that the principal and agent are in conflict.  Agency theory indicates 
that this conflict can be managed with the implementation of an appropriate control system that 
motivates both parties to achieve the same outcome (Anderson and Oliver 1987).  Similar to 
control theory, the principal has two options, one is to implement a behavior-based control 
system and the other is to simply measure outcomes (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Challagalla and 
Shervani 1997).  A behavior-based contract is a form of hierarchical governance, whereas the 
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outcome-based contract represents market governance (Eisenhardt 1989; Krafft 1999).  With 
behavioral-based contracts, the information is in essence purchased and appropriate behaviors 
are rewarded (Krafft 1999).  Outcome contracts simply rewards the agent based on measured 
outputs.   
 
The decision to employ behavior-based versus outcome-based contracts has been shown to be 
influenced by several factors.  Kraft (1999) found that environmental uncertainty increases the 
use of behavioral controls.  Additionally, Krafft (1999) found that when output measures were 
complete and an adequate measure of performance, then the use of output-contracts was the most 
efficient choice.  Similarly, Bergen, Dutta and Walker (1992) propose that the more difficult it is 
to measure the outcomes of an agent’s task, the greater the efficiency of behavior-based 
contracts.  They also suggest that as goal conflict increases, outcome-based contracts become the 
most efficient choice. 
  
 
In the manufacturer/retailer relationship, the manufacturer must rely on the retailer to perform 
specific activities and tasks that ensure efficient distribution of its products.  These tasks and 
activities may include promotional, inventory management, and reverse logistic activities to 
name a few.  A decision to assimilate an IOS represents a new way of managing and evaluating 
the performance of the agent in regards to these tasks.  In essence, the manufacturer must decide 
if the behavioral control afforded by the IOS is the most efficient contract decision.   
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Transaction Cost Economics 
 
In contrast to agency and control theories, transaction cost analysis (TCA) suggests that the 
decisions surrounding assimilation of an IOS technology are equivalent to the decision to 
implement behavioral control system (Anderson and Oliver 1987).  This choice is analogous to 
the vertical integration decision which is a “hybrid governance” option that lies between the 
make or buy decision and are preferable under certain circumstances (Oliver and Anderson 
1994).  The lack of assimilation represents the decision to utilize an outcome control, which has 
been argued to correspond to most closely to market contracting or the decision to “buy” 
(Anderson and Oliver 1987).   
 
 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) suggests “that organizations select the lowest-cost transaction 
structures that effectively protect against partner opportunism, ensure that partners fulfill 
contractual obligations and provide a framework for dealing with uncertainties” (Houston and 
Johnson 2000).  According to TCA, specific assets need to be safeguarded from the opportunistic 
behavior of the channel partners, which can be done through appropriate governance structures 
(Heide and John 1990).  In exchange relationships that have high transaction costs, which are 
represented by high degrees of asset specificity and performance ambiguity and low levels of 
technological uncertainty, TCA suggests that vertical integration is the optimal governance 
structure (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006; Heide and John 1990; Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997).  However, in cases where vertical integration is cost prohibitive, hybrid forms of 
governance, such as joint action, alliances and vertical coordination will be employed rather than 
market governance structures (Buvik and John 2000; Heide and John 1990; Johnson and 
Houston 2000).   
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Transaction specific assets represent specialized investments in human and physical assets that 
are a required to support the exchange relationship but cannot be redeployed outside the focal 
relationship (Heide and John 1988).  Specific assets represent a sunk cost to the organization in 
that the value of the assets would be lost if the relationship is terminated (Heide and John 1988; 
Heide and John 1990; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  Specificity of the assets will vary depending 
on the extent to which they can be used with other channel partners or other applications within 
the organization (Heide and John 1988).  When the assets are less transferable they create 
switching costs that expose the follower to exchange hazards.  If the follower invests in specific 
assets the initiator has the potential to exploit these assets and act opportunistically.  For 
example, the initiator may take advantage of the follower’s locked-in position by demanding 
additional concessions from the follower.   
 
TCA suggests that the more the follower has invested in assets specific to the exchange with the 
initiator, the more the follower will try to safeguard those assets by vertically integrating with 
their channel partner (Heide and John 1990).  In the case of IOS’s, vertical integration is cost 
prohibitive, however, increasing the extent to which the two organizations are tied together 
through the assimilation of the technology would safeguard their investments.  Son, Narasimhan 
and Riggins (2005) found in their study of EDI usage that higher levels of asset specificity 
increased cooperation between channel members which lead to increased EDI usage in the 
relationship. Zaheer and Venkatram (1994) found that business process asset specificity, defined 
as the investments in resources that enable the exploitation of an IOS system for business 
competencies, increases the degree of electronic integration achieved through the deployment of 
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dedicated IOS systems. Additionally, Corsten and Kumar (2005) found that greater levels of 
transaction specific investments increased the level of efficient consumer response adoption. 
 
Technological uncertainty is the extent to which the technological requirements of the 
relationship are unstable (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).  Technological uncertainty 
represents the unpredictable changes in standards or specifications of the technological 
components necessary for the exchange relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).   
Contrary to asset specificity and performance ambiguity, relationships that are faced with high 
levels of technological uncertainty are best governed by market governance (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).  Market governance protects organizations from being locked into 
obsolete technologies (Heide and John 1990).   
 
While there has been little work in the IOS literature examining the relationship between 
technological uncertainty and governance structure, the channels literature provides some 
guidance.  Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) found that the higher the threat of technological 
obsolescence the less likely an organization was to vertically integrate. In a meta-analysis of 
transaction cost theory, Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (2006) support the assertion that 
technological uncertainty is best managed with market governance.  These studies suggest that 
when technological uncertainty is high, followers will be less willing to vertically coordinate and 
as such their degree of assimilation will be low. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
In this chapter a conceptual model is developed that examines the control problems that 
influence the assimilation of IOS’s. Additionally, we test for the moderating effects of bilateral 
governance mechanism (see Figure 1).  IOS researchers suggest that due to the multitude of 
explanatory variables that influence assimilation a complete model would be unmanageable 
(Grover 1993).  Additionally, there is no single theory that can be used to examine the 
relationship (Robey, Im and Wareham 2008).  As recommended by Robey, Im and Wareham 
(2008), we examine assimilation from several theoretical lenses that complement each other.   
 
ASSIMILATION 
While most researchers would agree that assimilation refers to the process spanning from 
awareness to commitment to widespread deployment, the terminology utilized to examine the 
process or subprocesses has limited consistency. Terms such as adoption, implementation, 
diffusion, infusion, IT usage and integration all refer to assimilation in some degree.  Adoption 
and assimilation are in some degree interchangeable terminology that represents the process of 
becoming aware, committing to and implementing technological innovations (Fichman and 
Kemerer 1997; Rogers 2003).  While IOS research has utilized both adoption and assimilation 
terminology, it appears that the key differentiating factor between these two distinct terms lies in 
the fact that assimilation research focuses predominately in the factors that lead to higher levels 
of deployment whereas the majority of adoption research focuses on the factors that influence the 
decision to adopt.  Terms such as implementation, integration, infusion and diffusion all 
converge around the subprocesses of deployment.  As our research is an attempt to understand 
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what factors influence the extent to which an organization deploys and utilizes an IOS, we 
employ the assimilation terminology.   
 
Assimilation has been conceptualized in a multitude of ways.  Meyer and Goes (1988) define 
assimilation as an “organizational process that is set in motion when (1) individual organization 
members first hear of an innovation’s development, (2) can lead to the acquisition of the 
innovation and (3) sometimes comes to fruition in the innovations full acceptance, utilization and 
institutionalization.”  Fichman and Kemerer (1997) conceptualize assimilation in a similar 
manner; however they define the assimilation stage as a “combined measure of earliness of 
initiation of assimilation activities, speed of assimilation activities and an absence of rejection, 
stalling or discontinuance.”  They suggest that there are six stages of assimilation awareness, 
interest, evaluation/trial, commitment, limited deployment and general deployment.  Armstrong 
and Sambamurthy (1999) define assimilation as “the success achieved by organizations utilizing 
the capabilities of IT effectively in their business activities.”   In their examination of the 
assimilation of interorganizational business process standards, Bala and Venkatesh (2007) define 
assimilation as the “degree to which the IPBS support and enable relevant business activities in 
the value chain and become widely deployed and routinized in the organization.”  Purvis, 
Sambamurthy and Zmud (2001) define assimilation as “the extent to which the use of the 
technology diffuses across the organizational projects or work processes and becomes routinized 
in the activities of those projects and processes.”   
 
In terms of IOS research, the conceptualizations are limited in several ways.  First, the current 
conceptualizations are limited in that they assume that deployment of technology automatically 
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results in business process changes that are necessary before the technology can be effectively 
utilized.  As Clark and Stoddard (1996) point out, technology and process innovations are often 
interdependent, however they can each be adopted independently.  Damanpour (1991) in his 
meta-analysis of innovation, made a distinction between technological innovations, described as 
the technological products, and administrative innovations, which are the administrative 
processes.  Others consider integration as the process of altering business practices (Kim, 
Cavusgil and Calantone 2005).   
 
Another limitation that must be addressed is in the conceptualization of deployment within the 
assimilation framework.  Fichman and Kemerer (1997) distinguish between limited deployment 
and general deployment.  Limited deployment refers to the establishment of a program within the 
organization that has been applied to a few uses (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  With general 
deployment the program has diffused through the organization and is used on a substantial basis 
(Fichman and Kemerer 1997).  Rai et al. (2006) further elaborate on this framework by adding 
partial deployment which differentiates between minimal and substantial use.  While the stage 
approach provides a richer measure of assimilation than other measures (e.g., time since 
adoption), it is limited in that it does not differentiate the use of the technology from the use of 
the information created from the technology.  For example, with RFID based IOS’s, one 
organization could have 100% usage of the tags, where all product lines utilize the technology 
and the application of the tags are routinized across the organization.  However, they might not 
utilize the readers, middleware or enterprise software components that are necessary to capture 
and disseminate the information.  In contrast, another organization could have 20% usage of 
tags, but also utilize readers, middleware and enterprise software systems that capture and 
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disseminate the information.  Classifying these organizations into deployment stages would 
prove to be difficult.  
 
As such, we suggest that there is a need to reconceptualize assimilation.  In line with other 
researchers, we suggest that IOS assimilation is multifaceted and includes both the physical 
adoption of the technological components and the utilization of the information obtained from 
the technology (Clark and Stoddard 1996; Rai et al. 2006).  Most IOS technologies are scalable 
and the deployment levels vary from a minimalistic approach that may meet a mandate but not 
enable information exchange to a full deployment that enables information exchange.  The 
minimalistic approach represents a decision to use a market or outcome-control mechanism to 
govern the relationship.  In contrast, a full deployment and utilization represents a highly 
sophisticated behavioral monitoring system that provides visibility into the channel activities that 
surround new product introductions, the execution of product promotions, responses to out-of-
stock situations, stock rotations, charge-back management, order reconciliation, inventory 
optimization and reverse logistics.  We define IOS assimilation as the degree to which the 
organization intends to adopt the IOS technologies that will support and enable relevant business 
activities that create value for the organization.  We suggest that it is comprised of three 
dimensions, technological assimilation, exploitive assimilation and exploritive assimilation.  
Additionally, we suggest that exploitive and exploritive assimilation are advanced assimilation 
processes that are dependent on the adoption of the technological components of the technology.   
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Technological Assimilation 
 
Iacovou, Benbasat and Dexter (1995) and Clark and Stoddard (1996) suggest that there is a 
distinction between technological and process assimilation.  With IOS’s there are specific 
components of the technology that enable information exchange with channel partners.  In the 
case of RFID-based systems, these include such components as the EPC global subscription, 
EPC-IS service, RFID tags, readers, middleware, enterprise exchange software and other 
technological components that enable information exchange across organizational boundaries 
(Curtin, Kauffman and Riggins 2007; Armenio et al. 2007).   Therefore, we define technological 
assimilation as the degree to which the organization plans to deploy the physical components of 
the technology within the organization (Ramamurthy and Premkumar 1995).  This is similar to 
the concept of technological connectivity discussed by Fawcett et al. (2007) and the concept of 
interfirm system integration presented by Kim, Cavusgil and Calantone (2006).  
 
Exploitive and Exploritive Assimilation 
Theories of organizational learning suggest that organizations make resource trade-offs between 
gaining new information about alternatives to improve their future standing and using current 
information to improve their current situation (March 1991).  This trade-off between “the 
exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties (March 1991), has been 
examined under the contexts of organizational adaptation, competitive advantage, knowledge 
sharing, technological innovation and supply chain relationships (Gutpa, Smith and Shalley 
2006; Im and Rai 2008; Subramani 2004).  Benner and Tushman (2002) examine exploitive and 
exploratory innovation as they relate to process management.  They define exploitive 
innovations as those innovations that “involve improvements in existing components and build 
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on the existing technological trajectory, whereas exploratory innovation involves a shift to a 
different technological trajectory.”  Im and Rai (2008) examine the antecedents and outcomes of 
exploratory and exploitative knowledge sharing in interorganizational relationships.  They define 
exploratory knowledge sharing as the “exchange of knowledge between firms in a long-term 
relationship to seek long-run rewards, focusing on the survival of the system as a whole, and 
pursuing risk-taking behaviors.”  Exploitative knowledge sharing is defined as the “exchange of 
knowledge between firms in a long-term relationship to seek short-run rewards, focusing on the 
survival of the components of the system and pursuing risk-averse behaviors.”  Subramani 
(2004) examines supply chain relationships and defines IT use for exploitation as the execution 
of structures interfirm processes and IT use for exploration as the execution of unstructured 
interfirm processes.  The argument is that the IT technology can be used to either improve 
existing processes for organizational benefits (cost reduction, process quality improvements, 
etc.) or it can be used to create new solutions to current problems that create soft benefits for the 
organization (Subramani 2004).  Similarly, He and Wong (2004) examine exploitive and 
exploitative innovations.  They define exploitive innovation as “technological innovation 
activities aimed at improving existing product-market domains and exploratory innovation as 
technological innovation aimed at entering new product-market domains.”  March (1991) states 
that “the essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competencies, 
technologies and paradigm…The essence of exploration is experimentation with new 
alternative.”  Researchers suggest that the value of assimilation is in its effective utilization 
(Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Seggie, Kim and Cavusgil 2006).   
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Following this logic, the value of an IOS can be obtained through exploitive and exploritive use 
of the technology.  We suggest that once the technological components have been purchased and 
installed, an organization can use the technology to “exploit old certainties” by employing the 
technology to make current processes and activities more effective.  In addition, an organization 
can “explore new possibilities” by finding new and innovative ways to utilize the technology, in 
essence creating new processes that add value to the organization. As such, we define exploitive 
assimilation as the degree to which the organization plans to utilize the IOS technology to 
redesign its business activities and tasks to achieve drastic improvements in performance and 
exploritive assimilation as the degree to which the organization plans to utilize the IOS to 
facilitate and support process innovation and transformations that create value for the 
organization. Eisenhardt (1985) suggests that the implementation of information systems makes 
behavior based control more likely.  This suggests that as technological assimilation increases, 
their likelihood of using it increases.  As such we posit:  
 
H1: The higher the technological assimilation, the higher the 
exploitive assimilation 
 
H2: The higher the technological assimilation, the higher the 
exploritive assimilation. 
 
EXCHANGE PROBLEMS 
Asset Specificity 
 
Asset specificity is defined as the extent to which the follower has invested in assets that are 
specific to the relationship with the initiating partner.  The more entrenched a follower is in its 
investment in its relationship with the initiator, the more costly it becomes to switch customers. 
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The higher switching costs motivate the follower to maintain the relationship by increasing the 
extent to which it coordinates with the initiator (Son, Narasimhan and Riggins 2005).  The basic 
tenet of this argument is that a follower attempts to safeguard their investments by engaging in 
collaborative efforts that strengthen the bond between the two organizations. In essence, the 
assimilation of the technology represents a degree of off-setting investments aimed at reducing 
the dependence asymmetry between the channel partners by locking the initiator into the 
relationship through the IOS (Heide and John 1988).  Son, Narasimhan and Riggins (2005) found 
that the more a supplier invested in the specific assets for the relationship as a whole, the more 
likely they were to intensify their cooperation with their customer, leading to higher levels of 
EDI usage.   Corsten and Kumar (2005) found that suppliers will safeguard their previously 
unprotected specific investments by increasing their collaborative conduct, such as adopting 
efficient consumer response programs, with the retailer.  As such, we posit the following:  
 
H3: The higher the asset specificity associated with the exchange 
relationship, the higher technological assimilation. 
 
 
Technological Uncertainty 
Prior research indicates that uncertainty in an exchange relationship will influence the choice of 
governance structure (Eisenhardt 1989; Rindfleish and Heide 1997).  Both TCA and agency 
theories posit the influence of uncertainty, however they propose conflicting hypotheses.  
Agency theory indicates that high levels of environmental uncertainty reduce a principal’s ability 
to preplan and increases the risk within the relationship (Eisenhardt 1989).  This risk must be 
managed by either transferring it to the agent or managing it within the organization.  Outcome-
based controls transfers the risk to the agent, whereas behavior controls internalizes the risk and 
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is managed by more diligent control mechanisms (Eisenhardt 1989).  Anderson and Oliver 
(1987) and Celly and Frazier (1996) found that when environmental uncertainty was high, 
behavior-based control was the most appropriate choice.  In contrast, TCA suggests that 
technological uncertainty is best managed with outcome-based controls, or market governance 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  Adaptation and 
information asymmetry problems are created by uncertainty (Heide and John 1990).  It has been 
argued that the divergence between these two theories lies in the distinct aspects of uncertainty 
and that the conflicting results are a result of broad definitions of the construct (Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt 1986).  We follow the logic of TCA and focus on the technological uncertainty that 
exists within a channel relationship.  As such, we define technological uncertainty as the extent 
to which the initiator is unable to accurately forecast the technological requirements of the 
relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).  The argument posited suggests that when 
the technological requirements of the relationship are in a state of flux, the choice of outcome 
controls protects the organization from getting locked-in to an obsolete technology (Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt 1986).  As such we hypothesize the following: 
 
H4: The higher the technological uncertainty associated with the 
exchange relationship the lower the technological 
assimilation. 
 
 
AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Performance Documentation 
 
In congruence with agency and control theories, the degree of uncertainty, or incomplete 
information, is determined by the characteristics of the task.  We examine the concept of 
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performance documentation, which we define as the extent to which the supplier has available 
forms of documentation to assess the retailer’s performance.  When accurate measures of 
performance exist within the agency relationship, the most efficient contract is based on 
outcome-control mechanisms (Jaworksi 1988).  In contrast, when the activities and tasks are 
difficult to evaluate, behavior-based controls are a more efficient form of governance (Bergan, 
Dutta and Walker 1992; Oliver and Anderson 1994).  Agarwal and Ramaswami (1993) and 
Ramaswami (2002) both find support for this proposition. In their studies, they find that 
outcome-based control strategies are more frequently employed when performance 
documentation is high.   Additionally, Krafft (1999) found that when output measures were 
complete and an adequate measure of performance, then the use of output-contracts was the most 
efficient choice.  In relation to IOS assimilation, it is expected that when an organization has 
high levels of performance documentation, they will be less likely to assimilate the technology.  
The rational is that the costs of assimilation outweigh the benefits associated with the evaluation 
tasks (Eisenhardt 1985). 
 
H5: The more performance documentation that exists to assess 
the relationship outcomes, the less likely they are to 
assimilate the technology 
 
 
 
Agent Orientation 
 
Agency theory assumes that goal conflict and information asymmetry exists within the 
relationship and the degree to which they occur will influence the choice of governance 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Agent orientation encompasses both of these 
concepts.  Agent orientation is defined as the extent to which the follower views the initiator as 
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an agent of the organization rather than a customer.  High agent orientation indicates that the 
follower views the initiator as an agent of the organization.  In these cases, the follower expects 
that the initiator will execute on specific activities and tasks that result in specific outcomes for 
the follower.  Considering that both parties are motivated by self-interest and performance 
ambiguity exists within the relationship, the follower will select a governance mechanism that is 
most efficient for the relationship at hand.  In contrast, low agent orientation suggests that the 
follower views the initiator as a customer of organization.  In these cases, the follower will 
acquiesce to requests from initiator.  In regards to IOS assimilation, organizations with low agent 
orientation will have higher levels of technological assimilation as they acquiesce to the initiator.  
As such, we posit:  
 
 
H6: The lower the agent orientation the more likely they are to 
assimilate the technology. 
 
 
BILATERAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Control and TCA theories address the role of informal controls.  In specific, it has been argued 
that informal controls operate in tandem with formal controls and may in fact have an interactive 
role (Heide 1994; Jaworski 1988; Jaworski, Stathaltopoulos and Krishnan 1993).  Informal 
controls, also conceptualized as bilateral governance mechanisms, are more relational in nature 
in that they rely on the participation of both channel members to collaboratively work together to 
achieve mutual goals (Heide 1994).  The bilateral governance processes are utilized in the 
ongoing maintenance of the interfirm relationship.  Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010) identify 
three bilateral mechanisms that operate within and exchange relationship. 
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Based on Heide’s (1994) conceptual work, bilateral mechanisms operate in the maintenance 
phase and include monitoring, incentive and enforcement mechanisms.  Bilateral incentives 
reflect the extent to which the expectations that fairness will prevail in the long-run (Heide 
1994).   Fairness is an incentive in that it represents the expectation that equity will pervade the 
relationship (Ring and Van de Ven 1994).  Behaviors are managed by the expectation that the 
relationship will continue into the future (Heide 1994).  Bilateral monitoring is defined as each 
organization’s evaluation of its own investments in the relationship to ensure they meet the 
expectation of the partner (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994).  Each organization 
will self-monitor to ensure that it will achieve the goals share with the channel partner.  Bilateral 
enforcement refers to the channel partner’s reliance on social norms to maintain compliance with 
prior expectations (Gilliland and Bello 2002).  When invoked, the enforcement mechanism 
utilizes internal elements such as trust and commitment to incite compliance (Heide 1994). 
 
When bilateral mechanisms exist within the exchange relationship, channel partners work 
together to achieve common goals.  The expectation of joint value creation, rather than self-
satisficing, works to motivate the channel partner collaboration.  Researchers contend that the 
more bilateral mechanisms that exist within a relationship, the more closely aligned are the 
channel members’ goals (Uzzi 1997).  Short term inequities are overlooked because of the 
expectations that fairness will occur over time (Black 1998; Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 
2010).  Additionally, coordination is increased as each party self-monitors its own activities so as 
they are in line with channel partner expectations (Ellickson 1987). Strong bonds create social 
ties that “impose normative obligations, pressuring organizations to honor agreements and keep 
promises” (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010).  Research indicates that assimilation of IOS’s 
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are influenced by relational depth, specificity and extendibility (Bala and Venkatesh 2007).  As 
such we posit the following: 
 
H7:  The higher the bilateral mechanisms the more likely they 
are to assimilate the technology. 
 
H8: The higher the bilateral mechanisms the more likely they are 
to exploitively assimilate. 
 
H9: The higher the bilateral mechanisms the more likely they are 
to exploritively assimilate. 
 
 
 
Bilateral governance mechanisms work within a relationship to manage interorganizational 
activities and tasks (Black 1998).  The strength of the social mechanism enhances the exchange 
relationships ability to accomplish joint goals both directly and indirectly.  Bilateral governance 
mechanisms work to align the goals of the channel members.  Bilateral mechanisms motivate 
partners to take positions of inequity in the short term due to the expectations of fairness and the 
belief that equity will prevail in the long run (Gibbons 2005).  Exchange relationships that are 
high in relational norms are better able to manage conflict and reduces opportunism (Brown, 
Crosno and Dev 2009; Heide and John 1992; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 2003).  Customer-
supplier relationships that are high in trust are more likely to utilize interorganizational 
technologies to much higher degrees (Hart and Saunders 1998).  Thus we expect that bilateral 
mechanisms will work to align channel partner goals and enhance the organization’s willingness 
to assimilate the technology.  As such we propose the following: 
 
 
H10: Greater bilateral governance strengthens the positive 
relationship between asset specificity and technological 
assimilation. 
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H11: Greater bilateral governance decreases the negative 
relationship between technological uncertainty and 
technological assimilation. 
 
H12: Greater bilateral governance decreases the negative 
relationship between performance documentation and 
technological assimilation. 
 
H13: Greater bilateral governance decreases the negative 
relationship between agent orientation and technological 
assimilation. 
 
H14: Greater bilateral governance strengthens the positive 
relationship between technological assimilation and 
exploitive assimilation 
 
H15: Greater bilateral governance strengthens the positive 
relationship between technological assimilation and 
exploritive assimilation. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, we present the research design and methodology that was used to test the 
conceptual model.  We begin with a description of the measures of this study.  Next, we discuss 
the sampling and data collection procedures. Finally, we identify the analytical procedures used 
to test the conceptual model. 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF EXOGENOUS CONSTRUCTS 
 
Exchange Problems 
Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity is the extent to which the follower has invested in assets that are specific to the 
relationship with the initiator.  Asset specificity is operationalized as the degree of investments in 
equipment, people and processes that are exclusive to and cannot be deployed outside of the 
focal relationship.   Items are based on the scales from Heide and John (1992) and Joshi and 
Stump (1999), and can be seen in Table 2.   
 
Technological Uncertainty 
Technological uncertainty is defined as the inability to accurately forecast the technical 
requirements of the relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).  Technological 
uncertainty is operationalized as the extent to which the technological requirements of the 
relationship are unstable.  The items are adapted from Narver and Slater (1990) and measure the 
degree to which the follower has difficulty predicting and understanding the technology. 
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Agency Problems 
Performance Documentation 
Performance documentation is the extent to which the follower has available forms of 
documentation to assess the initiator’s performance of tasks and activities required by the 
follower (Jaworski and MacInnis 1989; Jap 2001).  Items, adapted by Jap (2001), represent the 
degree to which documented information exists that enables the follower to evaluate the initiator 
on required activities and tasks. 
 
Agent Orientation 
Agent Orientation is defined as the degree to which the follower views the initiator as an agent of 
the organization rather than a just a customer.  Modified from Narver and Slater’s (1990) 
customer orientation scales, agent orientation is operationalized as the degree to which the 
follower focuses its business efforts on satisfying the needs of the end-customer rather than the 
initiator.  These items measure the degree to which the follower’s business objectives, resources 
and focus are on the satisfaction of either the follower or the end-customer.      
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF ENDOGENOUS CONSTRUCTS 
 
Assimilation 
 
Based on the relevant literature we define assimilation as the degree to which the organization 
intends to adopt the collaborative technologies that will support and enable relevant business 
activities that create value for the organization.  We dimensionalize the construct in terms of 
technological, exploitive and exploritive assimilation.  Considering that our context is RFID 
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collaborative technologies and the early stage of adoption of the technology, we measure 
assimilation as the propensity to assimilate rather than the actual behavior.   
 
Technological Assimilation 
Technological assimilation, modified from Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy (2002), 
represents the extent to which the follower agrees to purchase and deploy the technological 
components of the collaborative technology within their organization.  Before an organization 
can deploy and utilize the technology they must first purchase the components.  With RFID 
technologies these components are scalable, with the adoption of the tags being the most 
minimal degree of adoption.  These components include the tags, readers, middleware and 
enterprise systems that enable the collection of information between organizations.     
 
Exploitive Assimilation 
Utilizing the logic of March (1991), RFID technology represents a learning mechanism that can 
be used to improve existing organizational activities and tasks.   As such, we can define 
assimilation as the degree to which the follower plans to utilize the collaborative RFID 
technology to redesign its business activities and tasks to achieve drastic improvements in 
performance.  This conceptualization is similar to Subramani’s (2004) definition of IT use for 
exploitation, which is described as the use of IT to improve current structured interfirm processes 
that lead to discernable cost reduction and quality increasing benefits.  Following McGrath, 
(2001) we assess exploitive assimilation by asking respondents the degree to which their 
organization would use RFID technologies to monitor their channel partner in the execution of 
eight supply chain management tasks: (a) management of new product introductions, (b) 
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execution of product promotions, (c) management of out-of-stock situations, (d) rotation of 
stock, (e) chargeback management, (f) order reconciliation, (g) inventory optimization, and (c) 
reverse logistics management.  These items were derived from the literature and field work and 
validated by the pilot tests (Boeck and Wamba 2008; Delen, Hardgrave and Sharda 2007; 
Hingley, Taylor and Ellis 2007; Lee and Ozer 2007).  An index of the construct was created 
based on the average of the eight items. 
 
Explorative Assimilation 
Exploratative assimilation is defined as the degree to which the organization plans to utilize 
RFID to facilitate and support process innovation and transformations that create value for the 
organization.  Similar to exploitive assimilation, however, rather than focusing on the 
improvement of existing processes and activities, the end goal of exploritive assimilation is to 
experiment with the technology to create entirely new processes that add value to the 
organization (March 1991).  The scales were adapted from those used by Auh and Menguc 
(2005) and indicate the degree to which the respondent’s organization would use RFID in new 
and novel ways to improve the relationship with the initiator. 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF MODERATORS AND CONTROL VARIABLE 
 
Bilateral Governance 
 
Bilateral governance represents the bilateral socially-based governing mechanisms that exert 
control over the relationship (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994).  These are less 
formal governance patterns that utilize social ties as the conduits of behaviors that support the 
interorganizational relationship.  Following Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010) and Heide 
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(1994), bilateral governance is operationalized as the control mechanisms within the relationship 
that are manifested as bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring and bilateral enforcement. 
 
Bilateral incentives 
Bilateral incentives reflect the extent to which the expectations that fairness will prevail in the 
long-run (Heide 1994).   With bilateral incentives, both exchange members work together to 
motivate assimilation behaviors. Based on the expectation of fairness, bilateral incentives work 
to motivate the follower through the expectation of future gains. Adapted from scales from 
Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), bilateral incentives are measured in terms of the 
confidence that both organizations have in the relationship in terms of the distribution of equity.   
 
Bilateral monitoring 
Bilateral monitoring, adapted from the scale of Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), represents 
each organization’s evaluation of its own investments in the relationship to ensure they meet the 
expectation of their partner (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994).  Bilateral 
monitoring is operationalized as the extent to which each party monitor’s its own behavior in an 
attempt to appease the other.  Items measure the degree to which both organizations assess their 
own investments in relationship specific investments, as well as their own intention to continue 
the relationship. 
 
Bilateral enforcement 
Bilateral enforcement refers to the channel partner’s reliance on social norms to maintain 
compliance with prior expectations (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Gilliland and Bello 
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2002).  Bilateral enforcement is operationalized as the expectation that the shared expectations 
and strength of the relationship motivate the enforcement of both formal and informal 
agreements.  The items, adapted from Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), include items that 
measure the reliance upon relationship strength, collaboration and promise keeping. 
 
Relative Supplier Dependence 
 
Relative supplier dependence, adapted from the scales of Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), 
assesses the degree of comparative reliance of the supplier on the retailer.  These items measure 
the degree of switching costs, replaceability and dependence of the supplier on the retailer and 
the supplier’s perception of the retailer’s dependence on the supplier.  The values are derived by 
subtracting the supplier’s dependence on the retailer from the retailer’s dependence on the 
supplier.   
 
SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTON PROCEDURES 
 
Sampling Plan 
The retail industry was selected as an appropriate setting to test the proposed model.  In 
particular, this study focuses on the suppliers (followers) of retailer’s who are implementing 
RFID based collaborative technologies.  This industry was selected for the study because it is 
characterized by: (1) mandates that require the adoption of the technology as a condition of 
future exchanges, and (2) the availability of multiple followers who are most likely to vary in 
their assimilation of the technology.   
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The sampling frame was derived from two sources.  The first source was a customized list 
purchased from a top organization specializing in lead generation. The list was web-based and 
provided e-mail as well as phone contact information, so we were able to hand-select 3,500 
contacts based on the organization they worked for (a manufacturer that sold goods through 
retailers) and job titles (marketing managers, key account managers, V.P. of Sales, etc.).  The 
usable list size was reduced to 3,226 after accounting for insufficient and duplicate contact 
information.  The following procedure was used to contact each respondent for the final data 
collection.  Each contact was e-mailed (Appendix A) a request to participate in the study.  They 
were instructed to respond to the email if they were willing to participate.  If they agreed to 
participate, an e-mail was sent with the link to the survey (Appendix B).   
 
The second source was a “pay-for-input” online panel managed by a respected market research 
organization that specializes in the management and maintenance of online customer panels.   
Respondents were limited to marketing and sales managers and executives who worked for 
manufacturing organizations. The respondents completed the survey in exchange for a monetary 
payment.   
 
Both sample sources were directed to complete the survey via a hyperlink.  Screener questions 
were then used to filter out inappropriate respondents.  These questions included:  (1) Does your 
organization sell products directly to any retailers (chain drug stores, supermarkets, mass 
merchandisers, etc.);  (2) Do you have working knowledge of a relationship that your 
organization has with any retailer (i.e., do you interact on behalf of your organization with any 
retailer).  An answer of “no” to either of the questions ended the survey for the respondent.  
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After the screener questions, the respondent was asked to respond to the survey based on their 
organization’s relationship with a single focal retailer.  Following Jap (2001), the focal retailer 
was defined as an independent U.S. organization that resells your product.  They were told that 
the retailer should be one that they interact with on a regular basis; however it does not 
necessarily have to be their "most important" or "most favored" retailer, although it can be. This 
approach helps ensure that the sample includes varying ranges of values for the antecedents 
(Cohen et al. 2002).  Additionally, we referred to the focal retailer as “ALPHA” so as to protect 
the anonymity of the respondent.  The survey began with the assessment of various relational 
variables, and then a scenario was introduced.  The scenario represented a letter from “ALPHA” 
that required the respondents firm to adopt RFID technology.  Then they were asked the degree 
to which they would participate in the mandate.  The survey ended with several demographic 
questions.  A copy of the final survey can be seen in Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this chapter, we describe the data collection procedures, analyses and results of the tests of the 
conceptual model.  First we describe the questionnaire development and the sample.  Then we 
discuss the measurement model and its results.  Finally, we specify the structural model and 
evaluate the hypotheses. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Field Study  
 
We conducted in-depth interviews with 11 practitioners who were participating in the 
assimilation decision making process for their organization. The interviews were conducted at a 
well known RFID conference and lasted about thirty to sixty minutes.  These individuals 
represented a variety of industries (e.g., battery and gift wrap), companies and roles (e.g., VP of 
Sales, Marketing Manager, and IT Director).  The objective of this stage was to obtain real world 
insights into the obstacles that organizations were facing with the assimilation of RFID as well as 
identifying the key informant. 
 
The interviews provided several key insights that were used to formulate the research plan.  First, 
it validated the use of marketing and sales executives as our key informants.  These individuals 
had extensive interaction with the retailer and were part of the decision making process to adopt 
and assimilate collaborative technologies.  Second, we realized that there was a problem with 
how we were having the respondent identify the focal retailer.  The largest or even fourth largest 
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retailer would limit the variance we needed in terms our antecedent constructs.  Third, we were 
better able to understand the assimilation process.  Fourth, we were able to identify the relational 
variables that were influencing their decision to assimilate the technology.  Several informants 
spoke of protecting the investments that they had already made in the relationship as well as 
technological uncertainty based on past experience with the retailer.  To the extent possible, we 
integrated the key findings into the research instrument and utilized them to construct the first 
version of the questionnaire. 
 
Pre-Test 
 
 The primary objectives of the pretest were to purify the measures and validate our key informant 
selection.  We randomly selected 1,000 contacts from a mailing list of 3,226 that was generated 
from Jigsaw.com.  Jigsaw.com is a lead generation company that has over 24 million business 
contacts.  The mailing list was customized and each contact was individually selected based on 
their title and the organization they worked for.   Specifically, we selected contacts that were in 
sales and marketing and worked for organizations which offered products that were available in 
retail stores.   
 
An email requesting participation with a link to the study was sent to the contacts from the 
survey administrator’s website (Qualtrics.com).  Of the 1,000 e-mails sent, 126 respondents 
agreed to participate.  Of those, 47 were disqualified and 79 were qualified to participate in the 
study based on the two screener questions that verified that they (1) worked for manufacturer 
that sold directly to retailers and (2) interacted with the retailer on a daily basis.  Participation 
dropped off to 40 when we asked them to provide the initials of their focal retailer.  Due to the 
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length and complexity of the survey, missing data was prevalent and only 13 surveys were 
competed without missing data. 
 
Several key insights were provided by the pre-test.  First, e-mailing directly from our survey 
administrator (Qualtrics), provided us with little control and insight as to the true response rate.  
We had no way to validate that the e-mail addresses were correct or if they were viewed.  From 
this we learned that we needed a two step approach to contacting potential respondents.  The first 
step included sending an e-mail requesting participation.  This would allow us to keep track of 
bounce backs and allow potential respondents to opt-out of the study all together.  In the second 
step, we e-mailed those who wished to participate from our Qualtrics account with a link to the 
survey.  The second insight relates to the dropout rate of almost 50% after asking for the focal 
retailer’s initials.  This behavior suggests that the respondents did not feel secure in their 
anonymity.  Going forward we requested that they think of a focal retailer when answering their 
questions, however we would refer to this retailer as “ALPHA” in order to protect their 
anonymity.  Throughout the survey we reminded them that “ALPHA” was the focal retailer that 
they originally thought of in the beginning of the survey. Finally, based on the number of 
respondents that dropped out in the middle of the survey, we determined that the survey length 
was a problem.  We utilized the pre-test data to streamline the constructs and reduce the length of 
the survey to less than thirty minutes.  The final survey can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
The Final Sample 
 
Data for the final study was collected from two sources.  The first was derived from the same 
customized mailing list used in the pre-test.  The list provided e-mail and contact information for 
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3,226 hand-selected contacts based on two criteria: (1) the organization they worked for was a 
manufacturer that sold goods through a retailer and (2) job titles that included managers and 
executives of the sales and marketing departments.  1000 contacts were used for the pre-test, 
which left 2,226 remaining contacts.  A systematic sampling technique was utilized to select 
1,388 contacts from the list. The potential respondents were contacted via e-mail and requested 
to participate in the study.  For those who wished to participate, an e-mail was sent with a link to 
the survey. In order to further qualify the respondents they were asked two questions that 
determined whether or not their organization sold products directly through a retailer and if they 
had working knowledge of the relationship with any retailers. An answer of “no” to either 
question disqualified them from taking the survey. 
 
As seen in Table 3, we were able to get some form of response from 48% of the mailing list.  
The response breakdown of the 1,388 contacts includes the following:  687 were non-responders, 
338 were non-deliverable due to bounce backs, 166 opted out, 24 were disqualified with the 
screener questions, and 173 agreed to participate.  The high non-response rate may be attributed 
to SPAM filters or job turn-over, however we cannot be sure.  
 
We sent follow up e-mails to those who agreed to participate with a link to the survey.  Of the 
173 who agreed to participate, 123 completed the survey.  Considering the respondents that 
opted-out, there were a total of 339 potential respondents, this is a response rate of 36%.  We 
created a composite score for informant quality by summing the responses.  Following Stump 
and Heide (1996), respondents who scored less than 12 were discarded (See Table 4).  Our final 
sample from this source consisted of 120 respondents.   
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The second source was a “pay-for-input” online panel managed by a respected market research 
organization that specializes in the management and maintenance of online customer panels.   
Respondents were limited to marketing and sales managers and executives who worked for 
manufacturing organizations. Respondents were further qualified through two questions asking 
whether the organization they worked for sold goods directly to any retailer and if they interact 
with a retailer on behalf of their organization.   The respondents completed the survey in 
exchange for a monetary payment.   
 
We received 249 completed questionnaires.  24 surveys were discarded due to insufficient 
knowledge.  Additionally, we restricted the final sample to include only those who had 
completed the survey in above the 25th percentile (approximately 9 minutes).  The data was also 
reviewed for false open-ended answers and pattern responses.  We identified 9 surveys with false 
information and 14 with pattern responses, however they all fell below the 25th percentile and 
were previously considered for elimination. A total of 190 surveys were retained. 
 
Before combining the data sources, they were examined for statistical differences between the 
two groups.  Independent sample T-tests indicated that the group’s means did not vary, and thus 
we pooled the two data sets together.  Between the two sources, there was a total of 310 
completed surveys.  In order to maximize the quality of the data set, we imposed further 
restrictions.  Of the 310 completed surveys were removed an additional 51 respondents.  We 
discarded those respondents which had a survey time in the bottom 25th percentile, or 
approximately less than 10 minutes, thus eliminating an additional 21 respondents.  Additionally, 
we had a 1 page scenario representing a letter from the respondent’s focal retailer.  We 
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eliminated 30 surveys that were in the bottom 25th percentile in terms of time taken to read the 
letter (approximately 15 seconds).  A total of 259 usable surveys were obtained for the final 
sample. Demographic statistics of the sample can be seen in Table 5. 
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL VALIDATION PROCEDURES 
 
All variables were pre-tested prior to the development of our final survey instrument.  Once the 
scales were validated the pre-test, the final data was collected.  The hypotheses were then tested 
using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in LISREL 8.8 (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993).  
Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step process was followed.  We first created a measurement 
model of all the constructs, then after achieving acceptable fit statistics, the structural model was 
tested.   
 
Considering that the responses to the independent and dependent variables are obtained through 
the same source, common methods bias is of concern.  In order to remedy common methods 
bias, we followed Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) recommendations.  First, we separated our predictor 
and criterion variables within the survey instrument.  Second, we carefully constructed our scale 
items.  Additionally, we tested for common methods bias by utilizing Harmon’s one factor test. 
 
We utilized confirmatory factor analysis to verify unidimensionality of the constructs.  This was 
done by specifying the observed item to latent variable relationships and allowing the latent 
variable constructs to correlate with one another (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  Decisions to 
drop or retain items were based on Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) recommendations.  Several 
items were initially dropped based on their inter-item correlations. Three items were used to 
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indicate the constructs of asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance 
documentation, agent orientation, bilateral mechanism, supplier relative dependence, and 
exploratative assimilation.  Four items were used for the construct of technological assimilation.  
A single summed index time was used for exploitive assimilation.  A total of 26 items and 11 
latent constructs were utilized to test the model.  The final items used for the measurement 
model, along with their means, standard deviations and reliabilities can be found in Table 6.   
 
Specifying the matrix to be used in the estimation of the model is an important issue.  We 
utilized the covariance matrix, which was calculated by the LISREL 8.8 program after we 
provided the correlation matrix and standard deviations, which can be seen in Table 7.  
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique was used to analyze the covariance matrix.   
 
Due to the nature of our research questions and the complexity of the model, we followed the 
direction of Bagozzi and Edwards (1998) and partially aggregated the three bilateral mechanism 
constructs (bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring, and bilateral enforcement) by averaging the 
corresponding items used to measure each construct. The composite items were then used as 
items for the latent construct “bilateral mechanisms”.  We conceptualized bilateral mechanisms 
as a higher-order factor comprised of bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring and bilateral 
enforcement.  This corresponds with a second-order confirmatory factor model, which the items 
are posited to originate from the three first-order factors and the first-order factors originate from 
a second-order factor (see Table 8).    
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We ran the model with 11 first order constructs and corresponding 26 item measures.  For the 
single item construct of exploitive assimilation, the path was set to .95 and the error term was set 
to .05 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  For bilateral mechanisms, we followed Bagozzi and 
Edwards (1998) and used the composite scores for each of the three higher-order constructs as 
individual items.   
 
The model performed well and overall fit statistics suggest that the model is a good fit for the 
data.  While the χ2 test is significant (χ2(410) = 589.74, p=.00), this is an often a consequence of 
samples larger than 200 (Kline 2005).  Other measures of overall fit, indicate an acceptable fit 
(RMSEA = 0.044; NFI = .95; CFI = .98; SRMR = .045) (Hu and Bentler 1999).  The results of 
the measurement model can be seen in Table 9.   
 
MAIN EFFECTS: STRUCTURAL MODEL VALIDATON PROCEDURES 
 
We utilized LISREL 8.8 to test our hypothesized structural model.  First, we tested the main 
effects model at a disaggregated level, utilizing the same 11 constructs and 26 corresponding 
items as we did with the measurement model.  
 
The results of the disaggregated main effects model suggest that the hypothesized model is a 
relatively good fit for the data (see Table 10).  The χ2 is significant (χ2(274) = 418.44, p=.00), 
however the other measures indicate an acceptable fit (RMSEA = 0.045; NFI = .95; CFI = .98; 
SRMR = .050) and meet Hu and Bentler’s (1999) combination rule for acceptable fit.   
Parameter estimates were somewhat consistent with the hypotheses, with seven of the ten main 
effects hypotheses supported.  Alternative models were examined to determine if the paths 
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hypothesized were fully or partially mediated.   After examining alternative models to determine 
full or partial mediation, a better fitting model was identified.  Surprisingly, the best fitting 
model freed the path between technological uncertainty and exploritive assimilation, which was 
not originally hypothesized.   While the  χ2  was different (χ2(273) = 406.71, p=.00), the other 
measures are similar to the original model (RMSEA = 0.044; NFI = .95; CFI = .98; SRMR = 
.047). A χ2 difference test indicates that the models are significantly different and favors the 
model with the path freed between technological uncertainty and exploritive assimilation (∆χ2(1)  
= 11.73, p = .00).  Freeing additional paths did not improve fit statistics, suggesting that 
technological assimilation fully mediates the relationship between the antecedents and outcomes.  
The fit statistics and parameter estimates for this model can be seen in Table 11. As such, we test 
our hypothesized main effects with the alternative model. 
 
We found support for H1, which contends that the more specific assets the supplier has deployed 
in the relationship, the more likely they will be to purchase the collaborative technology (β = .20, 
t=1.95, p = .05).   Regarding H2, there was no support for the effect that technological 
uncertainty has on technology assimilation (β = .09, t=1.16, p = .24).  However, we did find that 
technological uncertainty has a positive direct effect on exploritive assimilation (β = .16, t=3.45, 
p = .00).   For H3, there was no support and the sign was contrary to our expectations.  While we 
expected to find that performance documentation would decrease technological assimilation, the 
sign was positive and insignificant (β = .11, t=1.53, p = .13).   While not significant, the 
unexpected sign suggests that the more documentation that exists to assess the initiator’s 
performance, the more likely they are to purchase the technological components of the 
collaborative technology.  We found no support for H4, which focuses on agent orientation 
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decreasing technological assimilation, however the sign is in the appropriate direction (β = -.06, 
t= -1.09, p = .28).   There is strong support for H5, H6 and H7, which indicates that the more 
bilateral mechanisms that exist within the relationship, the more likely the supplier is to 
assimilate the collaborative technology (H5: β = .50, t=5.42, p = .00; H6: β = .17, t=2.41, p = .00;  
H7: β = .27, t=3.95, p = .00).   Hypotheses 8 and 9 suggest that the more a technological 
assimilation occurs the higher the exploitive and exploritive assimilation.  Both hypotheses are 
supported, which indicate that the more technological components are purchased the more likely 
the supplier is to utilize the technology to improve efficiency of current processes (H6: β = .55, 
t=8.31, p = .00) as well as facilitating innovations that create value for the organization (H7: β = 
.57, t=8.66, p = .00).   
 
MODERATING EFFECTS OF BILATERAL MECHANISMS 
 
Due to the complexity and size of the model and sample, as well as our desire to perform tests of 
moderation, we utilized a total aggregation model and retested the structural model.  We 
followed Bagozzi and Edwards (1998) and aggregated the model by creating composites of each 
of the constructs.  Specifically, the three or four items for each construct were averaged to create 
one composite indicator per construct.   In this model, 11 constructs were tested with 11 
corresponding consolidated items.  We then used this aggregated model to test for moderation. 
 
We set the λ paths equal to the square root of the reliability and the error variance to one minus 
the reliability and multiplied it by the variance of the scale item.  The results of the totally 
aggregated model suggest an improved fit, compared with the partially disaggregated model, but 
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have similar path estimates. The χ2 is insignificant (χ2(9) = 11.76, p=.22), and the other measures 
indicate  good fit (RMSEA = 0.034; NFI = .99; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .024).  Parameter estimates 
can be seen in Table 12 were consistent with the partially disaggregated model. Both models 
account for a substantial portion of the variance in technological assimilation (SMC = .42), 
exploitive assimilation (SMC = .44) and exploritive assimilation (SMC = .59).  Due to the good 
fit statistics and parsimonious nature of the aggregated model, we continue our analysis by 
testing for moderating effects.  
 
To test for the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms we followed the recommendations of 
Wen, Marsh and Hau (2010) and modeled the latent interactions.  This strategy requires the 
creation of double mean centered interaction terms, which is a three step process (Wen, Marsh 
and Hau 2010).  First, we mean centered the independent and moderating variables.  Next, we 
created a product term by multiplying the mean centered independent and moderator variables. 
The last step requires that the product term is mean centered to create the final interaction term 
that is used for the analysis. Since we used the totally aggregated model to test moderation, we 
had to set the λ paths equal to the square root of the reliability and the error variance to one 
minus the reliability and multiplied it by the variance of the scale item.  With the interaction 
terms the reliability was considered to be the product term of the reliabilities of the independent 
and moderator variables used to create the interaction term.  We utilized the alternative model 
derived from our main effects models to test the hypotheses. 
 
The results of the moderated model suggest that the hypothesized structural model is a relatively 
good fit for the data (see Table 13). The χ2 is insignificant (χ2(18) = 21.12, p=.27), and the other 
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measures indicate an acceptable fit (RMSEA = 0.026; NFI = .98; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .02) and 
meet Hu and Bentler’s (1999) combination rule for acceptable fit.  Parameter estimates for the 
main effects were similar to the main effects models and can be seen in Table 13 along with the 
standard errors, t-values and significance.  Additionally, the parameter estimates for the 
interaction variables were somewhat consistent with the hypotheses, with support for four of the 
six moderation hypotheses.   
 
We found support for H10, which contends that bilateral mechanisms will strengthen the 
relationship between asset specificity and technological assimilation (β = .18, t=2.01, p = .06).   
A simple slope analysis indicates that the technological assimilation and asset specificity 
relationship increases as bilateral mechanisms increase (δTech/δAsset = .27+.18BM).    
 
Regarding H11 and H12, there was no support for the hypothesis that that bilateral mechanisms 
weakens the relationship between both technological uncertainty and performance 
documentation and technology assimilation (H11: β = -.07, t=-.78, p = .44; H12: β = -.01, t=-.21, 
p = .84).    
 
We found support for H13, which suggests that bilateral mechanisms weakens the negative 
relationship between agent orientation and technological assimilation (β = .16, t= 2.37, p = .03).   
A simple slope analysis indicates that as bilateral mechanisms increase the slope of the 
technological assimilation and agent orientation relationship quickly becomes positive 
(δTech/δAgent = -0.08+.16BM).    
 
65 
 
Additionally we find strong support for H14 and H15, which indicates the bilateral mechanisms 
strengthens the relationship between technology assimilation and both exploitive and explorative 
assimilation (H14: β = .15, t=2.71, p = .01; H15: β = .12, t=2.36, p = .03). A simple slope 
analysis indicates that the positive relationship between exploitive assimilation and technological 
assimilation is strengthened by bilateral mechanisms (δExploit/δTech = 0.57+.15BM).   A 
similar relationship exists between exploritive assimilation and technological assimilation 
(δExplore/δTech = 0.57+.15BM).    
 
In order to further understand the interactions, we followed Aiken and West (1991) and further 
probed and graphed the interactions.  For each interaction, we split the independent variable and 
the interaction term into high and low groups, then used general linear modeling to acquire the 
means.  We then graphed the mean differences to examine the moderating effect.  For H10, the 
interaction was positive and significant.  The analysis (see Figure 2) indicates that the original 
positive effect between asset specificity and technological uncertainty is strengthened by 
bilateral mechanisms.  The main effects indicate that low asset specificity results in lower levels 
of assimilation of the technological components.  The positive interaction indicates relationships 
that exhibit higher levels of bilateral mechanisms, the higher the technological assimilation at 
both low and high levels of asset specificity.  For H13, the interaction was significant and 
positive.  However, the main effects model indicated that the relationship between agent 
orientation and technological assimilation was negative, albeit insignificant.  In this case, the 
more the supplier viewed the retailer as an agent for their organization, the less likely they were 
to adopt the technology.  The analysis (see Figure 3) suggests that when bilateral mechanisms are 
high, this effect is diminished and technological assimilation is increased.  For H14, the main 
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effects relationship between technological assimilation and exploitive assimilation was positive 
and significant, as was the interaction.  This suggests that the more technological components the 
supplier purchases the more likely they were to utilize the technology to improve current 
business processes.  As seen in Figure 4, with relationships that exhibit high levels of bilateral 
mechanisms this effect is intensified, especially when technology assimilation is high.  For H15, 
the main effects relationship was positive and significant.  This indicates that the more 
technological assimilation that occurs, the more likely they are to use the technology in 
innovative and new ways that add value to the organization.  The interaction terms was also 
positive and significant and the analysis (see Figure 5) suggests that relationships that exhibit 
high levels of bilateral mechanisms are more likely to exploritively assimilate the technology 
than those with low levels of bilateral mechanism, this is especially so when high levels of 
technological assimilation exist. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Our analysis revealed several key insights.  First, the mediated model of assimilation appears to 
be a good representation of the key relationships involving assimilation in channel relationships.  
Results of the structural equation models indicate a consistency between the hypothesized model 
and the data.  The confirmatory factor provides evidence for sound measures.  The goodness-of-
fit statistics and significant proportions of explained variance both provide support for the 
hypothesized structure. 
 
The results signify that variables in the channel relationship influence the assimilation behaviors 
of the channel partner who was mandated to adopt the technology.  While theory and extant 
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literature has demonstrated that the transaction cost and agency theory variables effect decisions 
to pursue joint action and behavioral monitoring, these relationships have not been explored in 
the context of collaborative technology assimilation.  We find that several of these variables are 
predictive of assimilation.  In particular we found that channel partners who have invested 
significant amounts of resources specific to focal relationship are more likely to adopt the 
technology.  Interestingly, we found the performance documentation relationship to be positive, 
which was contrary to expectations.  Additionally, the positive relationship between 
technological uncertainty and exploritive assimilation was not hypothesized.  The positive 
moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms indicate the importance of relationalism in the 
assimilation process. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
In Chapter 5, the results of the study were described, examining the effects of asset specificity, 
technological uncertainty, performance documentation and agent orientation on IOS 
assimilation.  In this chapter we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications from the 
findings.  Limitations for the research is examined.  Finally, we discuss additional research 
questions which may be addressed in future research. 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
The purpose of this study was to understand the mechanisms of IOS assimilation (i.e., the extent 
to which firms deployed and utilized the technology) within channel relationships.  A conceptual 
model was developed and tested that posits the conditions that are likely to increase or decrease 
an organization’s assimilation of an IOS in mandated situations.  We theorized that five key 
constructs would differentially effect the assimilation of the IOS.   It is significant in that it is an 
empirically rigorous study of assimilation as it combines the theories surrounding governance.  
Additionally, it makes several key contributions to academic literature and managerial practice.  
Our results suggest that the relational factors of asset specificity and agent orientation influence 
the decision to assimilate an IOS and that existing governance structures (bilateral governance) 
play a significant role in accelerating this process. 
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Our results indicate that the higher the level of technological component assimilation the more 
likely the firm is to utilize the technology to improve current business processes and use it in 
innovative ways that add value to the firm. While this seems intuitive, the current streams of 
research tend to examine deployment as either a dichotomous decision variable, where you have 
either adopted or not adopted the technology (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter 2001; Grover 2003; 
O’Callaghan, Kaufman and Konsynski 1992).  Or as assimilation, which combines the use of the 
technology with the implementation of the physical components (Bala and Ventakesh 2007; 
Fichman and Kemerer 1997; Rai et al. 2006).  Examining assimilation in terms of technological, 
exploitive and exploritive provides a richer understanding of the assimilation process. 
 
Our results indicate that exchange relationships that have higher levels of asset specificity have 
higher levels of technological assimilation.  The assimilation process represents a form of 
vertical integration that channel partners use to safeguard these assets (Heide and John 1990).  
Firms will assimilate the technology in an attempt to protect the investments that they have 
already made in the relationship (Heide and John 1988; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  These 
findings are in line with previous research which found that higher levels of asset specificity 
increased the deployment and usage of IOS technologies (Corsten and Kumar 2005; Son, 
Narasimhan and Riggins 2005; Zaheer and Venkatram 1994).  
 
We did not find support for the relationship between technological uncertainty and technological 
assimilation.  Additionally, the sign was not as we expected, we had hypothesized a negative 
relationship between technological uncertainty and technological assimilation, but the sign, while 
insignificant, is positive (β = .09, t=1.16, p = .24).  Interestingly, in our alternative model 
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analysis, we found that that relationship between technological uncertainty and exploritive 
assimilation was significant and positive (β = .16, t=3.45, p = .00).  This suggests that 
relationships that exhibit more technological uncertainty, where the technological requirements 
of the relationship tend to be unstable and quickly become obsolete, the more likely the 
following channel partner is to use the technology to improve current business processes.  This is 
contrary to TCA theories, which would suggest that the following partner would be less likely to 
adopt the technology due to the risk associated with the purchase.  
 
We did not find any main effects support for the two agency theory variables, performance 
documentation and agent orientation, we proposed.  We had expected to find that the more 
documentation that existed to measure performance the less likely they were to assimilate the 
technology.  However, performance documentation was not only insignificant, but the sign was 
positive, which is contrary to our hypothesis.  This is similar to the findings of Jaworksi, 
Stathakopoulos and Krishnan (1993), who had hypothesized that the more complete the 
evaluation system, the greater the likelihood that output controls would be utilized, but their 
results indicate that the greater the completeness the more likely they were to utilize behavioral 
controls.  Agent orientation was insignificant, however in the correct direction. 
 
Bilateral mechanisms play an important part in the assimilation of interorganizational 
technologies.  Bilateral mechanisms represent the informal social controls that exist within the 
relationship and serve to align goals and create joint value (Heide 1994; Uzzi 1997).  The results 
indicate that relationships operate with high levels of bilateral mechanisms are more likely to 
assimilate the technology as well as finding ways to explore and exploit its utility.  This is an 
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important implication, as the value derived from an IOS is highly dependent on the usage of the 
technology.  Utilizing the technology to improve current business processes or innovate new 
businesses processes is crucial to creating value for the system. 
 
Bilateral mechanisms not only directly impact the three assimilation variables, but they also play 
a key moderating role.  The findings indicate that bilateral mechanisms interact with asset 
specificity, agent orientation and technological assimilation.  Bilateral mechanisms strengthen 
the relationship between asset specificity and technological uncertainty. Channel relationships 
that are higher in bilateral mechanisms are more likely to adopt the technology, even when asset 
specificity is low.  In regards to agent orientation, bilateral mechanisms weaken the negative 
relationship between agent orientation and technological assimilation.  Firms that view their 
channel partner as an agent of their firm rather than just a customer and were in relationships 
with low bilateral mechanisms, were less likely to assimilate the technology than those that were 
in relationships with high levels of bilateral mechanisms.  Bilateral mechanisms also play an 
important part in the utilization of the technology.  The interaction between bilateral mechanisms 
and technological assimilation influences both exploitive and exploritive assimilation.  The 
results indicate that at low levels of technological assimilation bilateral mechanisms will 
minimally increase exploitation and exploration assimilation.  However, when technology 
assimilation is high, channel relationships high in bilateral mechanisms were much more likely 
to exploit and explore the technology.  
 
This study provides empirical evidence that supports the use of governance theories in the 
examination of assimilation.   It suggests that firms in relationships that are high in asset 
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specificity and bilateral mechanisms will be more likely to assimilate the technology as well as 
exploit and explore the uses of the technology. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study provides empirical support for the importance of studying IOS assimilation under the 
lens of governance.  The results indicate that factors surrounding the exchange relationship will 
influence a follower’s degree of assimilation of an IOS.  The three complementary theories of 
control theory, agency theory and transaction cost analysis provided a strong theoretical 
foundation for the research. 
 
We found that the constructs of asset specificity and technological uncertainty played important 
roles in the assimilation process.  Asset specificity was a key determinant of technological 
assimilation.  Technological uncertainty provided interesting findings, insignificant in relation to 
technological assimilation, but significant in relation to exploritive assimilation.  While this 
finding was unexpected, and contrary to theory, it suggests that the higher the risk associated 
with the technology the more likely they are to use it to improve current business processes.  
This finding tends to be more in line with the agency perspective, as Celly and Frazier (1996) 
found, environmental uncertainty was strongly related to the use of behavior-based controls. The 
rationale behind this argument is that an emphasis on agent behaviors my reduce riskiness 
associated with the relationship.  The information that is obtained through exploitive assimilation 
of the technology may guard against opportunism, reducing uncertainty for the principal (Celly 
and Frazier 1996). 
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While the constructs of performance documentation and agent orientation were not significant, 
there theoretical justification was strong.  Support for task characteristics influencing control 
choice is empirically validated through other studies (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1993; Bergan, 
Dutta and Walker 1992; Krafft 1999; Oliver and Anderson 1994; Ramaswami 2002).  The 
findings are rather puzzling and suggest that further investigation into the relationship between 
performance documentation and technological assimilation is needed.  The level of significance, 
(p=.12) suggests that it might be a sample size issue.   
 
Agent orientation did not have a significant main effect, but was shown to interact with bilateral 
mechanisms.  This construct is similar to customer orientation; however it looks at the degree to 
which the firm views the channel partner as an agent of the firm, or a customer.  It represents a 
type of goal orientation.  The findings are significant in that followers that are not socially tied to 
their channel partners are less likely to adopt the technology when they view their partner as an 
agent of the firm.  This finding is noteworthy in that it emphasizes the importance of the informal 
controls in agent relationships.     
 
Bilateral mechanisms were the most significant indicator of assimilation.  They had a strong 
influence on all three aspects of assimilation, technological, exploitive and exploritive, as well as 
interactive effects.  Agency theory, control theory and TCA all discuss the role of the informal 
controls that exist within an exchange relationship.  However, there is limited research that 
examines what effect they have on the choice of outcome versus behavior-based controls 
(Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994).  This research provides further support for 
the importance of bilateral governance mechanisms that operate within exchange relationships.   
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our study provides several important implications for industry leaders, executives and members 
of standards-development consortia.  First, firms that are mandated to participate in an IOS with 
a channel partner should be aware that the decision they are making is one of governance more 
so than adoption.  The decision to continue the relationship and assimilate the technology should 
be based on efficient contracts.  As such, the benefits of the IOS need to be evaluated in terms of 
the efficiency of the behavioral controls that are enabled by the IOS.  Rather than focusing on the 
technological demands of the initiator, a following firm would be better suited to evaluate the 
activities and tasks that the initiator undertakes on their behalf.  In almost all retailer-supplier 
relationships, there are some channel activities that could possibly benefit from the visibility 
provided by an IOS technology.  For example, Gillette utilized an RFID-based IOS to track 
product replenishment during promotional periods and found that those stores that moved 
product from the back room to the store floor prior to the promotion had a 48% increase in 
average dollars per point of sale than those who did not.  It also identified that 38% of stores 
were not executing promotions correctly (Murphy 2005).   
 
Second, with major retailers, such as Wal-mart, moving towards direct-from-manufacturer 
relationships and away from middlemen, efficient management of channel activities and tasks 
becomes crucial.  IOS’s provide bilateral behavioral-control and monitoring for both channel 
partners, which increases the efficiency of the channel system.  However, this only occurs when 
both channel partners assimilate the technology.  Therefore understanding the assimilation is 
critical to both firm and channel performance.  Identifying channel partners who will reap the 
most benefits from the new governance system that the IOS creates, has the potential to increase 
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the success rate of the IOS system mandated by an initiator.  As evidenced by Wal-Mart’s ever 
changing RFID-mandate, blanketed mandates are ineffectual at best.  This research suggests that 
initiating firms would be more successful if they were to identify the channel partners with 
whom they have the highest levels of bilateral mechanisms and asset specificity.  Those firms 
with high levels of relationship specific assets are motivated to participate in IOS’s due to the 
sunk costs already invested.  Following firms that were in channel relationship with high 
expectations of fairness, self-monitoring and social control were much more likely to adopt the 
technology than those who weren’t.  Additionally, the existence of bilateral mechanisms also 
encourages higher levels of utilization of the technology for both current business practices and 
innovative uses of the technology.   
 
It is rather intuitive that technological assimilation would lead to higher rates of exploitive and 
exploritive assimilation.  Interestingly, most of the emphasis from industry leaders and 
standards-development consortia focuses on the constructs of compatibility, complexity and 
trialability, all derived from the theory of innovation (Rogers 2003).  While, the diffusion of 
innovations are dependent on the communication of the benefits of a new technology, these 
constructs influence the decision to adopt the technology rather than the decision to assimilate 
the technology.  Our research suggests that with collaborative IOS’s it is also important to focus 
on the benefits that the visibility will provide in terms of reducing performance ambiguity and 
improving channel efficiency.   
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LIMITATIONS 
 
While this study makes some promising contributions to the literature we must note some 
limitations.  Several trade-offs had to be made over the course of the study, first, we conducted 
the research under the setting of retailers and suppliers and focused on one particular IOS 
technology—RFID technology.  This raises questions of generalizability to other IOS 
applications as well as the assimilation of RFID-based IOS’s in other industries. However, 
restricting the sample to this context allows us to control for external sources of variation.  
 
The respondents were asked to select a particular retailer that their company sells through.  
While this had to be a retailer that the respondent interacted with on a regular basis, it did not 
have to be the “most important” or “most favored” retailer. We assumed that the choice of 
relationship was randomly distributed across the population and this may have minimal effects 
on the results of the study.  Additionally, we referred to this retailer as “ALPHA” in order to 
maintain the anonymity of the respondent.  While we consistently reminded them that “ALPHA” 
was the focal firm that they first thought of in the beginning of the survey, we assumed that this 
was indeed the case. 
 
Another limitation is that power is not explicitly incorporated into the model, although the 
literature indicates its importance in dyadic relationships.  We included supplier relative 
dependence as a control variable to account for any asymmetry in dependence.   
 
A fourth possible limitation is that we relied on a single key informant.  This leads to issues of 
key informant competency and differing perspectives among parties in the relationship.  The first 
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issue was managed through informant quality checks, which revealed that respondents were 
knowledgeable and capable to participate.  The second issue surrounds common methods bias.  
In order to remedy common methods bias, we followed Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) 
recommendations.  First, we separated our predictor and criterion variables within the survey 
instrument.  Second, we carefully constructed our scale items.  Additionally, we tested for 
common methods bias by utilizing Harmon’s one factor test. 
Finally, the survey was designed so that respondents were asked to react to a specific scenario 
that addressed a mandate to adopt RFID technology.  RFID was selected due to the relative 
newness of the technology as well as the early adoption stage, where very few firms had actually 
adopted the technology. While, all respondents were familiar with the technology, one might 
argue that it might have been better to create a fictitious IOS technology in the scenario. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This research examines the assimilation of collaborative IOS’s in channel relationships.  It 
frames the assimilation decision process in terms of a governance issue, which allows for several 
important research directions.  First, assimilation is assessed in terms of purchasing the physical 
components, as well as assimilating it to improve current business processes and innovate new 
business processes.  While the technology is necessary for the exploitive and exploritive 
assimilation, there might be additional antecedents that differentially influence these assimilation 
outcomes.  Considering that the value of IOS’s are derived from the capture and dissemination of 
information, it is important to understand what encourages exploitive and exploritive 
assimilation. 
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The results of this research indicate that bilateral mechanisms play an important role in the 
assimilation process. However, there are other relational variables that may influence the process 
as well.   Further research might involve looking at other informal control variables, such as 
social norms or relationalism.   Additionally, Heide (1994) suggests that unilateral mechanisms 
work in tandem with bilateral mechanisms.  Future research might include both the bilateral and 
unilateral mechanism. 
 
The focus of the study was on the assimilation process and it was outside of our scope to 
examine potential outcomes for exploitive and explorative assimilation.  While research suggests 
that assimilation of IOS’s lead to organizational change, increased firm performance, strategic 
benefits and operational benefits, further research might examine how exploitive and exploritive 
assimilation influence these benefits.  
 
This research was limited in that it only looked at RFID assimilation in retailer-supplier 
relationships.  It would be beneficial to see if the conceptual model is generalizable to other 
types of relationships, such as manufacturer-supplier, or dealer-manufacturer relationships.  
Additionally, IOS’s differ in the extent to which they are scalable and the degree to which they 
change the governance structure of the exchange relationship, so research examining additional 
IOS’s in channel relationship would be useful. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1 
Hypothesized Direct and Moderator Effects on Assimilation 
 
 Proposed Effect on Assimilation 
Hypotheses Technological 
Assimilation 
Exploitive 
Assimilation 
Explorative 
Assimilation 
 Mediation Variable    
H1/2 Technological Assimilation  + + 
 Exchange Problem Variables    
H3 Asset Specificity +   
H4 Technological Uncertainty -   
 Agency Problem Variables    
H5 Performance Documentation -   
H6 Agent Orientation -   
 Governance Variables    
H7/8/9 Bilateral Mechanisms + + + 
 Moderating Variable    
H10 Asset SpecificityXBilateral Mechanisms Strengthen   
H11 Technological UncertaintyXBilateral 
Mechanisms 
Weaken   
H12 Performance DocumentationXBilateral 
Mechanisms 
Weaken   
H13 Agent OrientationXBilateral Mechanisms Weaken   
H14/15 Technological AssimilationXBilateral 
Mechanisms 
 Strengthen Strengthen 
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TABLE 2 
 
Response Formats and Items 
Scale Response Anchor Sample Items 
Asset Specificity (AS) 7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
1. We have made significant investment in 
equipment dedicated to our relationship 
with ALPHA . 
2. We have many people that are dedicated 
exclusively to our relationship with 
ALPHA. 
3. Our operating process has been tailored 
to meet the requirements of dealing with 
ALPHA. 
Technological 
Uncertainty (TU) 
7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
1. It is difficult for us to predict what 
technological requirements ALPHA will 
have for us in the future. 
2. ALPHA often expects us to use 
technologies that are not well 
understood. 
3. When ALPHA requires our firm to 
purchase new technology, it quickly 
becomes obsolete. 
Performance 
Documentation (PD) 
7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
1. We have the necessary documented 
information to measure ALPHA’s 
performance on completed activities. 
2. Enough documented information exists 
to enable us to evaluate ALPHA’s 
activities. 
3. We are confident that the documented 
information we have is sufficient to 
evaluate ALPHA’s performance. 
Agent Orientation (AO) 7-point scale: The 
Retailer/Then End 
Consumer 
1. Our business objectives are driven 
primarily by the satisfaction of … 
2. Most of our efforts and resources are 
dedicated to… 
3. We are more focused on satisfying the 
needs of… 
Bilateral Mechanisms 
(BM) 
7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
Bilateral Incentives: 
1. The confidence that any short term 
financial inequities will be made up over 
time serves as a strong incentive for both 
firms to cooperate. 
2. The confidence that the financial benefits 
will be fair over the long run serves as a 
strong incentive for both firms to 
cooperate. 
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3. The confidence that the investments 
made in the relationship today will pay 
off over the long run serves as a strong 
incentive for both firms to cooperate. 
Bilateral Monitoring: 
1. Each firm monitors its own investment 
of financial resources into the 
relationship, to ensure it meets the 
expectations of its partner. 
2. Each firm monitors the level of 
personnel resources it invests into the 
relationship, to ensure it meets the 
expectations of its partner. 
3. Each firm measures its own intention to 
make future investments in the 
relationship, to ensure it meets the 
expectations of its partner. 
Bilateral Enforcement: 
1. The strength of our relationship will keep 
the parties honest in dealing with each 
other. 
2. We will work together to resolve any 
discrepancies that may arise. 
3. We will keep our promises to each other 
because we value our partnership. 
Supplier Relative 
Dependence (SRD) 
7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
Supplier Dependence: 
1. There are other retailers that could 
provide us with comparable 
distribution. 
2. Our total costs of switching to a 
competing retailer would be 
prohibitive. 
3. It would be difficult for us to replace 
the sales and profits ALPHA 
generates. (R) 
Retailer Dependence:  
1. There are other suppliers who could 
provide the retailer with comparable 
product lines 
2. ALPHA would incur minimal costs 
in replacing our firm with another 
supplier. 
3. It would be difficult for ALPHA to 
replace the sales and profits 
generated from our firm’s product 
line. (R) 
Technological 
Assimilation (TECH) 
7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
1. My organization would purchase all of 
the hardware and software (tags and 
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readers) necessary to meet the 
requirements of ALPHA. 
2. My organization would purchase the 
technological equipment that would 
allow us to filter, manage and store the 
data collected. 
3. My organization would purchase RFID 
components that allow us to share data 
with ALPHA. 
4. My organization would purchase the 
equipment necessary to share the data 
across the functional units of my 
firm. 
Exploitive Assimilation 
(PLOIT) 
7-point scale: No RFID 
use/Significant RFID use 
(Summed Index) 
Indicate the extent to which your org 
would use RFID techno to monitor 
ALPHA on the following tasks:  
1. Manages our new product 
introductions 
2. Executes our product promotions 
3. Responds to out-of-stock situations 
4. Rotates our stock 
5. Manages chargebacks to our firm 
6. Reconciles our orders 
7. Optimizes inventory levels for our 
products 
8. Manages reverse logistics for our 
product. 
Explorative 
Assimilation (PLORE) 
7-point scale: Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree 
1. My organization would find new 
applications of RFID for process 
innovation with ALPHA. 
2. My organization would find new ways to 
use RFID in working with ALPHA. 
3. My organization would utilize RFID 
to find new ways to manage our 
relationship with ALPHA. 
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TABLE 3 
Response Rates 
 
Non-response 687 49% 
Non-deliverable (bounce-
backs) 
338 24% 
Opted-out 166 12% 
Disqualified 24 2% 
Agreed to Participate 173 12% 
Total 1388  
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TABLE 4 
Informant Quality Items 
Scale Response Anchor Sample Items 
Informant Quality 7-point scale: 1 = Not 
very knowledgeable to 
7= Very knowledgeable 
How knowledgeable are you about the 
following in your organization’s relationship 
with ALPHA? 
The nature of unique investments and assets 
that are used in the relationship 
The tasks and activities that ALPHA 
performs for your organization 
The quality of the relationship with ALPHA 
The technological requirements of the 
relationship. 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Final Sample 
Firm Size based on Annual Revenue Number % of Sample 
Less than $100,000 5 1.9 
$100,000 to $500,000 4 1.5 
$500,001 to $1,000,000 14 5.4 
$1,000,001 to $5,000,000 24 9.3 
$5,000,001 to $10,000,000 29 11.2 
$10,000,001 to $50,000,000 41 15.8 
$50,000,001 to $100,000,000 28 10.8 
>$100,000,001 114 44 
 
 
 
Descriptive Category Mean 
Length of Relationship with Focal Retailer (months) 23.8 
Percent of Sales Accounted for by Retailer 23.1% 
Months in Current Position 58.3 
Age 47 
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TABLE 6 
Main Study Measurement Item Properties: Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Construct/Items Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Alpha 
Asset Specificity 
1. We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to our 
relationship with ALPHA . 
2. We have many people that are dedicated exclusively to our relationship 
with ALPHA. 
3. Our operating process has been tailored to meet the requirements of 
dealing with ALPHA. 
5.17* 
5.08 
 
5.06 
 
5.37 
1.38* 
1.67 
 
1.79 
 
1.43 
 
.794 
Technological Uncertainty 
1. It is difficult for us to predict what technological requirements ALPHA 
will have for us in the future. 
2. ALPHA often expects us to use technologies that are not well 
understood. 
3. When ALPHA requires our firm to purchase new technology, it quickly 
becomes obsolete. 
3.30* 
3.85 
 
3.17 
 
2.88 
1.35* 
1.61 
 
1.61 
 
1.45 
 
.832 
Performance Documentation  
1. We have the necessary documented information to measure ALPHA’s 
performance on completed activities. 
2. Enough documented information exists to enable us to evaluate 
ALPHA’s activities. 
3. We are confident that the documented information we have is sufficient 
to evaluate ALPHA’s performance. 
5.67* 
5.78 
 
5.65 
 
5.57 
1.09* 
1.13 
 
1.21 
 
1.27 
 
.890 
Agent Orientation  
1. Our business objectives are driven primarily by the satisfaction of … 
2. Most of our efforts and resources are dedicated to… 
3. We are more focused on satisfying the needs of… 
4.33* 
4.49 
4.10 
4.42 
1.58* 
1.85 
1.72 
1.81 
.859 
Bilateral Mechanisms 5.47* .99*  
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 Bilateral Incentives (average of three items) 
1. The confidence that any short term financial inequities will be made up 
over time serves as a strong incentive for both firms to cooperate. 
2. The confidence that the financial benefits will be fair over the long run 
serves as a strong incentive for both firms to cooperate. 
3. The confidence that the investments made in the relationship today will 
pay off over the long run serves as a strong incentive for both firms to 
cooperate. 
Bilateral Monitoring (average of three items) 
1. Each firm monitors its own investment of financial resources into the 
relationship, to ensure it meets the expectations of its partner. 
2. Each firm monitors the level of personnel resources it invests into the 
relationship, to ensure it meets the expectations of its partner. 
3. Each firm measures its own intention to make future investments in the 
relationship, to ensure it meets the expectations of its partner. 
Bilateral Enforcement(average of three items) 
1. The strength of our relationship will keep the parties honest in dealing 
with each other. 
2. We will work together to resolve any discrepancies that may arise. 
3. We will keep our promises to each other because we value our 
partnership. 
5.22 
5.16 
 
5.14 
 
5.37 
 
5.42* 
5.49 
 
5.31 
 
5.47 
 
5.78* 
5.60 
 
5.87 
5.87 
1.41 
1.52 
 
1.53 
 
1.50 
 
1.41* 
1.24 
 
1.32 
 
1.26 
 
1.01* 
1.23 
 
1.07 
1.13 
.927 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.929 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.859 
Supplier Relative Dependence  
Supplier Dependence – Retailer Dependence 
1. There are other retailers (suppliers) that could provide us with 
comparable distribution (product lines). 
2. Our total costs of switching to a competing retailer (supplier) would be 
prohibitive. 
3. It would be difficult for us (ALPHA) to replace the sales and profits 
ALPHA (we) generates. (R) 
 
.30* 
-0.23 
 
0.55 
 
0.57 
 
1.56* 
1.88 
 
1.89 
 
1.87 
 
 
.770 
Technological Assimilation  
1. My organization would purchase all of the hardware and software (tags 
and readers) necessary to meet the requirements of ALPHA. 
2. My organization would purchase the technological equipment that would 
4.53* 
4.55 
 
4.50 
1.62* 
1.76 
 
1.71 
.954 
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allow us to filter, manage and store the data collected. 
3. My organization would purchase RFID components that allow us to share 
data with ALPHA. 
4. My organization would purchase the equipment necessary to share the 
data across the functional units of my firm. 
 
4.59 
 
4.49 
 
1.69 
 
1.74 
Exploitive Assimilation  
Indicate the extent to which your org would use RFID techno to monitor ALPHA 
on the following tasks:  
1. Manages our new product introductions 
2. Executes our product promotions 
3. Responds to out-of-stock situations 
4. Rotates our stock 
5. Manages chargebacks to our firm 
6. Reconciles our orders 
7. Optimizes inventory levels for our products 
8. Manages reverse logistics for our product. 
23.10** 
 
 
4.30 
4.49 
4.92 
4.24 
4.20 
4.47 
4.79 
4.22 
14.51** 
 
 
2.10 
2.11 
2.09 
2.07 
2.20 
2.09 
2.03 
2.00 
-- 
Explorative Assimilation  
1. My organization would find new applications of RFID for process 
innovation with ALPHA. 
2. My organization would find new ways to use RFID in working with 
ALPHA. 
3. My organization would utilize RFID to find new ways to manage our 
relationship with ALPHA. 
4.69* 
4.66 
 
4.64 
4.78 
1.59* 
1.68 
 
1.67 
1.66 
 
.951 
*Means for the Consolidated Scales 
**Mean of Summed Scale 
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TABLE 7 
Item Measures Correlation Matrix with Standard Deviations 
 
Items AS1 AS2 AS3 TU1 TU2 TU3 PD1 PD2 PD3 AO1 AO2 AO3
AS1 1.00
AS2 0.60 1.00
AS3 0.50 0.60 1.00
TU1 0.22 0.23 0.29 1.00
TU2 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.64 1.00
TU3 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.57 0.66 1.00
PD1 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
PD2 0.24 0.18 0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 0.72 1.00
PD3 0.24 0.22 0.15 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 0.67 0.80 1.00
AO1 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -0.15 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
AO2 -0.14 -0.17 -0.22 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.58 1.00
AO3 -0.12 -0.19 -0.18 -0.11 -0.18 -0.04 0.10 0.07 -0.01 0.70 0.73 1.00
SRD1 0.02 0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.14 -0.25 -0.22 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06
SRD2 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.16 -0.12
SRD3 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.25 -0.17 -0.19
BINC1 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.09
BINC2 0.24 0.21 0.24 -0.05 -0.11 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.08
BINC3 0.25 0.24 0.28 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.18 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
BMON1 0.26 0.21 0.20 -0.05 -0.14 0.02 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.02 0.01
BMON2 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.03
BMON3 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.04
BENF1 0.21 0.14 0.21 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.01
BENF2 0.18 0.13 0.14 -0.15 -0.18 -0.07 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.05
BENF3 0.23 0.15 0.17 -0.09 -0.19 -0.08 0.22 0.24 0.20 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
GTECH1 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.21 -0.08 -0.17 -0.16
GTECH2 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.21 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09
GTECH3 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.20 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15
GTECH4 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.09 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.23 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07
PLORE1 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.04 -0.07 0.01
PLORE2 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.18 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05
PLORE3 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.19 -0.02 -0.12 -0.10
St. Devs 1.67 1.79 1.46 1.61 1.61 1.45 1.12 1.21 1.27 1.85 1.71 1.81
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Items SRD1 SRD2 SRD3 BINC1 BINC2 BINC3 BMON1 BMON2 BMON3 BENF1 BENF2 BENF3
SRD1 1.00
SRD2 0.48 1.00
SRD3 0.42 0.68 1.00
BINC1 0.02 0.00 -0.14 1.00
BINC2 -0.03 -0.04 -0.18 0.85 1.00
BINC3 0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.75 0.83 1.00
BMON1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.43 0.43 0.41 1.00
BMON2 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 0.41 0.45 0.39 0.81 1.00
BMON3 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.80 0.83 1.00
BENF1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.40 0.43 0.38 1.00
BENF2 -0.13 -0.12 -0.18 0.37 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.64 1.00
BENF3 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.65 0.73 1.00
GTECH1 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.31
GTECH2 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.29
GTECH3 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28
GTECH4 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.33 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.28
PLORE1 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.32
PLORE2 0.02 -0.04 -0.09 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.30
PLORE3 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.32 0.33
St. Devs 1.88 1.89 1.87 1.52 1.53 1.50 1.24 1.32 1.26 1.23 1.07 1.13
 
 
 
Items GTECH1 GTECH2 GTECH3 GTECH4 PLORE1 PLORE2 PLORE3
GTECH1 1.00
GTECH2 0.84 1.00
GTECH3 0.83 0.87 1.00
GTECH4 0.76 0.88 0.86 1.00
PLORE1 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.63 1.00
PLORE2 0.58 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.86 1.00
PLORE3 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.90 1.00
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TABLE 8 
Bilateral Mechanisms as a Second-Order Factor 
Standardized Estimates 
A: First-Order Loadings 
Indicator Bilateral Incentives Bilateral Monitoring Bilateral Enforcement 
BI1 .88a   
BI2 .97 (23.38)b   
BI3 .86 (19.33)   
BM1  .88a  
BM2  .92 (21.43)  
BM3  .91 (20.97)  
BE1   .77a 
BE2   .84 (13.53) 
BE3   .86 (13.79) 
B: Second-Order Loadings 
Bilateral Incentives .73a   
Bilateral Monitoring .67 (8.40)   
Bilateral Enforcement .76 (8.46)   
aFixed Parameters 
bt-values are in parentheses 
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TABLE  9 
Main Study Measurement Item Properties: Parameter Estimates, t-values and SMC’s 
 
Construct/Items Standardized 
Loading 
t-value SMC 
Asset Specificity 
1. We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to our 
relationship with ALPHA . 
2. We have many people that are dedicated exclusively to our relationship 
with ALPHA. 
3. Our operating process has been tailored to meet the requirements of 
dealing with ALPHA. 
 
.73 
 
.79 
 
.74 
 
-- 
 
10.86 
 
10.46 
 
.53 
 
.63 
 
.56 
Technological Uncertainty 
1. It is difficult for us to predict what technological requirements ALPHA 
will have for us in the future. 
2. ALPHA often expects us to use technologies that are not well 
understood. 
3. When ALPHA requires our firm to purchase new technology, it quickly 
becomes obsolete. 
 
.75 
 
.85 
.77 
 
-- 
 
11.97 
11.48 
 
.56 
 
.73 
.59 
Performance Documentation  
1. We have the necessary documented information to measure ALPHA’s 
performance on completed activities. 
2. Enough documented information exists to enable us to evaluate 
ALPHA’s activities. 
3. We are confident that the documented information we have is sufficient 
to evaluate ALPHA’s performance. 
 
.78 
 
.93 
 
.86 
 
-- 
 
15.58 
 
14.94 
 
.61 
 
.86 
 
.74 
Agent Orientation  
1. Our business objectives are driven primarily by the satisfaction of … 
2. Most of our efforts and resources are dedicated to… 
3. We are more focused on satisfying the needs of… 
 
.75 
.78 
.93 
 
-- 
12.62 
13.28 
 
.56 
.61 
.87 
Bilateral Mechanisms    
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Bilateral Incentives (consolidated) 
Bilateral Monitoring (consolidated) 
Bilateral Enforcement(consolidated) 
.74 
.68 
.73 
-- 
9.47 
9.94 
.55 
.47 
.53 
Supplier Relative Dependence  
Supplier Dependence – Retailer Dependence 
1. There are other retailers (suppliers) that could provide us with 
comparable distribution (product lines). 
2. Our total costs of switching to a competing retailer (supplier) would be 
prohibitive. 
3. It would be difficult for us (ALPHA) to replace the sales and profits 
ALPHA (we) generates. (R) 
 
 
.56 
 
.84 
 
.81 
 
 
-- 
 
8.21 
 
8.23 
 
 
.31 
 
.69 
 
.67 
Technological Assimilation  
1. My organization would purchase all of the hardware and software (tags 
and readers) necessary to meet the requirements of ALPHA. 
2. My organization would purchase the technological equipment that would 
allow us to filter, manage and store the data collected. 
3. My organization would purchase RFID components that allow us to share 
data with ALPHA. 
4. My organization would purchase the equipment necessary to share the 
data across the functional units of my firm. 
 
.87 
 
.95 
 
.93 
 
.92 
 
-- 
 
23.81 
 
22.70 
 
22.17 
 
.76 
 
.90 
 
.86 
 
.85 
Exploitive Assimilation  1.00 -- 1.00 
Explorative Assimilation  
1. My organization would find new applications of RFID for process 
innovation with ALPHA. 
2. My organization would find new ways to use RFID in working with 
ALPHA. 
3. My organization would utilize RFID to find new ways to manage our 
relationship with ALPHA. 
 
.89 
 
.96 
.93 
 
-- 
 
26.48 
24.54 
 
.80 
 
.93 
.87 
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TABLE  10 
Structural Model: Partially Disaggregated Main Effects Model 
Model Parameters Estimate S.E. T-value Sig. 
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation .20 0.12 2.06 ** 
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation .08 0.09 1.07 ns 
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation .10 0.11 1.52 ns 
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation -.06 0.07 -1.08 ns 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation .49 0.13 5.40 *** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation .17 1.03 2.40 *** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation .21 0.09 3.21 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation .55 0.09 8.32 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation .62 0.06 9.57 *** 
Control Variable: 
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation 
 
.14 
 
0.10 
 
2.06 
 
** 
     
Variance Explained SMC  Fit Indices  
Technological Assimilation .44 Chi-squared 418.44 
Exploitive Assimilation .44 Degrees of freedom 274 
Explorative Assimilation .58  p-value 0.00 
   SRMR .050 
 
  CFI .98 
   RMSEA .045 
     
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
***p<.01 
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TABLE  11 
Structural Model: Partial Disaggregated Alternative Main Effects Model 
Model Parameters Estimate S.E. T-value Sig. 
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation .19 0.12 1.95 ** 
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation .09 0.09 1.16 ns 
Technological Uncertainty  Explorative  Assimilation .16 0.06 3.45 *** 
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation .10 0.11 1.53 ns 
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation -.06 0.07 -1.09 ns 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation .50 0.14 5.42 *** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation .17 1.03 2.41 ** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation .27 0.10 3.95 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation .55 0.53 8.31 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation .57 0.05 8.66 *** 
Control Variable: 
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation 
 
.15 
 
0.10 
 
2.26 
 
** 
     
Variance Explained SMC  Fit Indices  
Technological Assimilation .45 Chi-squared 406.71 
Exploitive Assimilation .44 Degrees of freedom 273 
Explorative Assimilation .61  p-value 0.00 
   SRMR .047 
 
  CFI .98 
   RMSEA .044 
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
***p<.01 
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TABLE  12 
Structural Model: Total Aggregation Model 
Model Parameters Estimate S.E. T-value Sig. 
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation .28 0.11 3.03 *** 
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation .02 0.09 0.31 ns 
Technological Uncertainty  Explorative  Assimilation .15 0.05 3.41 *** 
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation .11 0.10 1.64 ns 
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation -.05 0.06 -0.79 ns 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation .40 0.11 5.87 *** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation .13 0.91 2.12 * 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation .21 0.09 3.83 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation .59 0.55 10.02 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation .61 0.05 11.22 *** 
Control Variable: 
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation 
 
.14 
 
0.07 
 
2.09 
 
* 
     
Variance Explained SMC  Fit Indices  
Technological Assimilation .42 Chi-squared 11.76 
Exploitive Assimilation .44 Degrees of freedom 9 
Explorative Assimilation .59  p-value 0.23 
   SRMR .024 
 
  CFI 1.00 
   RMSEA .034 
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
***p<.01 
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TABLE  13 
Structural Model: Total Aggregation Moderated Model 
Model Parameters Estimate S.E. T-value Sig. 
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation .27 .12 2.53 ** 
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation .05 .10 .62 ns 
Technological Uncertainty  Explorative  Assimilation .16 .05 3.50 *** 
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation .10 .10 1.49 ns 
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation -.08 .06 -1.27 ns 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation .44 .13 5.58 *** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation .18 .97 2.86 *** 
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation .25 .09 4.32 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation .57 .55 9.83 *** 
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation .60 .05 11.02 *** 
Control Variable: 
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation 
 
.11 
 
.07 
 
1.72 
 
* 
Moderator Variables:     
Asset SpecificityXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation .18 .10 2.01 * 
Technological UncertaintyXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation -.07 .10 -.78 ns 
Performance DocumentationXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation -.01 .10 -.21 ns 
Agent OrientationXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation .16 .07 2.37 ** 
Technological AssimilationXBilateral Mechanisms Exploitive Assimilation .15 .49 2.71 *** 
Technological AssimilationXBilateral Mechanisms Explorative Assimilation .12 .05 2.36 ** 
     
Variance Explained SMC  Fit Indices  
Technological Assimilation .45 Chi-squared 21.12 
Exploitive Assimilation .46 df 18 
Explorative Assimilation .61  p-value .27 
   SRMR .02 
 
  CFI 1.00 
   RMSEA .026 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
***p<.01 
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Asset Specificity X Bilateral Mechanisms Interaction 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Agent Orientation X Bilateral Mechanisms Interaction 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Technological Assimilation X Bilateral Mechanisms Interaction 
Exploitive Assimilation 
 
 
Exploratative Assimilation 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
Introduction E-mail 
 
SUBJECT:  Question from a Doctoral Student from Georgia State University 
 Hello, from Georgia State University!  My name is Jennifer Fries and I am a doctoral student in 
the Marketing Department at GSU.  I am currently trying to complete my dissertation which 
examines the relationship between suppliers and retailers and the effects of collaborative 
technologies. 
 
 Based on your credentials, I believe that you might be an excellent candidate for participation in 
this study.  It will only require 20 minutes of your time and I will share a summary of the results 
once the study is complete. 
 
The study is being conducted online, so if you would like to participate, please reply to this email 
and I will send you a link to the study. 
 
 If you would prefer not to participate, then simply respond to this email and I will remove you 
from my database. 
 
I hope you will participate.  If you have any questions or comments please feel free to contact me 
by phone at (404) 413-7685 or via email at jfries@gsu.edu. 
 
Thank you for your time and have a wonderful day! 
 
Jennifer 
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APPENDIX B 
Study Participation E-mail 
 
Dear  XXX,  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study.  Your opinions are greatly appreciated. It will 
only require approximately 20 minutes of your time and in return I will provide you an executive 
summary of the findings once the study is complete. 
 
The survey will close on July 15, 2010. 
 
You can participate in the study by accessing the questionnaire online in the following ways: 
 
Follow this link to the Survey:  
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey} 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
${l://SurveyURL} 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails:  
${l://OptOutLink} 
 
If you have any questions about this research you can contact me at 678-360-4856 
(jfries@gsu.edu).  For additional verification, please feel free to contact my Advisor, Dr. Dan 
Bello at 404-413-7658 (dbello@gsu.edu) or Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 
404-413-3513 (svogtner1@gsu.edu). 
 
Thank you for your time and have a wonderful day! 
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APPENDIX C 
Final Survey Instrument 
 
Thank you for your willingness to share your opinions with us.  Your participation in this study 
is completely voluntary. If you have any questions at any time regarding this survey you may 
contact Jennifer Fries by phone at (404) 413-7685 or by email at  mktjlfx@langate.gsu.edu.   The 
survey should take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Please be aware that you cannot use 
the BACK button on your browser.  You may start the survey now by clicking on the button 
below. 
 
 
Georgia State University 
Department of Marketing 
Informed Consent 
 
Principal Investigators:  Pam Ellen (PI)    Jennifer Fries (Student PI) 
 
I. Purpose: 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to examine how the 
relationship between suppliers and retailers influences a supplier’s decision to adopt 
collaborative technologies. You are invited to participate because your firm has a direct 
relationship with one or more retailers. A total of 300 participants will be recruited for this study. 
Participation will require approximately 20 minutes of your time. 
II. Procedures: 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire that asks 
questions about your organization’s relationship with the retailer. Additionally, you will be 
presented with a decision scenario and asked how you expect your organization to respond. The 
questionnaire will be online and provided to you via email. No monetary payment will be 
provided for participation in this study. 
III. Risks: 
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. 
IV. Benefits: 
Participation in this study qualifies you for a free executive summary of the results. Overall, we 
hope to gain information regarding how the interorganizational relationship influences a 
supplier’s decision to adopt technology with a retailer. 
V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: 
Participation in research is voluntary. You have the right not to be in this study. If you decide to 
be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip 
questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits 
to which you are otherwise entitled. 
VI. Confidentiality: 
We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Pamela Ellen and Jennifer Fries 
will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with those who 
make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board and the Office for 
Human Research Protection (OHRP). We will not use any identifying information on study 
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records. The information you provide will be stored on a password-protected computer. Your 
name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we present this study or 
publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be 
identified personally. 
VII. Contact Persons: 
Contact Jennifer Fries at mktjlfx@langate.gsu.edu or 770-413-7685 if you have questions about 
this study. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research 
study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404.413.3513 or 
svogtner1@gsu.edu. 
VIII. Copy of Consent Form to Subject: 
You can print a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
Does your organization sell products directly to any retailers (chain drug stores, supermarkets, 
mass merchandisers, etc)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you have working knowledge of a relationship that your firm has with any retailer (i.e., do 
you interact on behalf of your firm with any retailer)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Please think of a particular retailer (an independent U.S. organization that resells your product) 
that your company sells through. This should be a retailer that you interact with on a regular 
basis.  The retailer does not necessarily have to be your "most important" or "most favored" 
retailer, although it can be.    Please answer the following questions, specifically as they relate to 
this focal retail customer and your organization's relationship with them.  We will refer to this 
retailer as "ALPHA."  From this point forward when we mention a retailer named “ALPHA”, 
please think of the real retailer that you identified here. 
 
How many years has your organization been selling through ALPHA? 
______ Number of Years 
 
What percentage of your organization's overall annual sales volume is accounted for by 
ALPHA? 
______ Percentage of Overall Annual Sales Volume 
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How knowledgeable are you about the following in your organization’s relationship with 
ALPHA? 
 
Not very 
knowledgeable  
1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
knowledgeable  
7 
The nature of unique investments 
and assets that are used in the 
relationship 
              
The tasks and activities that 
ALPHA performs for your 
organization 
              
The quality of the relationship 
with ALPHA               
The technological requirements 
of the relationship               
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Regarding your organization’s relationship with ALPHA, to what extent do you agree with the 
following statements? 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
We have made 
significant 
investments in 
equipment dedicated 
to our relationship 
with ALPHA. 
              
We have developed 
procedures and 
routines that are 
tailored to ALPHA. 
              
We have many 
people that are 
dedicated exclusively 
to our relationship 
with ALPHA. 
              
Our operating 
process has been 
tailored to meet the 
requirements of 
dealing with 
ALPHA. 
              
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Thinking about the technological requirements that ALPHA has for your organization, please 
indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
ALPHA changes the 
technology 
requirements for the 
relationship quite 
often. 
              
It is difficult for us to 
predict what 
technological 
requirements 
ALPHA will have for 
us in the future. 
              
ALPHA often 
expects us to use 
technologies that are 
not well understood. 
              
We never know what 
type of technological 
changes to expect 
from ALPHA. 
              
When ALPHA 
requires our firm to 
purchase a new 
technology, it 
quickly becomes 
obsolete. 
              
Often the new 
technological 
requirements from 
ALPHA do not 
perform as promised. 
              
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Thinking about the documented information that your organization has to evaluate ALPHA's 
performance, indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
We have the 
necessary documented 
information to 
measure ALPHA’s 
performance on 
completed activities. 
              
Enough documented 
information exists that 
we can evaluate 
ALPHA’s activities. 
              
Documents exist to 
assess the 
performance of most 
of ALPHA's 
activities. 
              
We are confident that 
the documented 
information we have 
is sufficient to 
evaluate ALPHA’s 
performance. 
              
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Please indicate the extent to which  ALPHA or the end-consumer is the focus for your 
organization for the following statements: 
 
ALPHA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
The End-
Consumer 
7 
We mostly monitor and assess our level of 
commitment to serving the needs of…              
Our business objectives are driven primarily 
by the satisfaction of …              
Our strategy for competitive advantage is 
based primarily on our understanding of the 
needs of…. 
             
Most of our efforts and resources are 
dedicated to…              
We are more focused on satisfying the needs 
of….              
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On the next page we will show you a letter.  For the purpose of this exercise, assume that the 
letter is from your focal retailer that we are referring to as ALPHA.  Please read the letter, then 
answer the subsequent questions in terms of how you believe your firm would react. 
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Assuming the letter represents a real initiative from your focal retailer, ALPHA, please indicate 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
My organization 
would purchase all of 
the hardware and 
software (tags and 
readers) necessary to 
meet the requirements 
of ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would purchase the 
technological 
equipment that would 
allow us to filter, 
manage and store the 
data collected. 
              
My organization 
would purchase RFID 
components that 
allow us to share data 
with ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would purchase the 
equipment necessary 
to share the data 
across the functional 
units of my firm. 
              
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Assuming that the letter represents a real initiative from ALPHA, indicate the extent to which 
your organization would use RFID technology to monitor ALPHA on the following tasks.   We 
would use RFID technology to monitor how ALPHA: 
 
No 
RFID 
use  
1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Significant 
RFID use  
7 
Manages our new product introductions             
Executes our product promotions             
Responds to out-of-stock situations             
Rotates our stock             
Manages chargebacks to our firm             
Reconciles our orders             
Optimizes inventory levels for our products             
Manages reverse logistics for our products             
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Assuming that the letter represents a real initiative from ALPHA, please indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
My organization 
would use RFID in 
new ways that add 
value to the 
relationship with 
ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would find new 
applications of RFID 
for process innovation 
with ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would spend 
considerable time and 
effort exploring the 
potential applications 
of RFID in our 
relationship with 
ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would leverage RFID 
to create completely 
new business 
processes with 
ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would find new ways 
to use RFID in 
working with 
ALPHA. 
              
My organization 
would utilize RFID to 
find new ways to 
manage our 
relationship with 
ALPHA. 
              
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The next set of questions will ask you about your organization's relationship with your focal 
retailer that we are referring to as ALPHA.  Please answer all questions as they pertain to your 
actual relationship with this real retailer. 
 
For both my firm and ALPHA... 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The confidence that 
any short term 
financial inequities 
will be made up over 
time serves as a 
strong incentive for 
both firms to 
cooperate. 
              
The confidence that 
the financial benefits 
will be fair over the 
long run serves as a 
strong incentive for 
both firms to 
cooperate. 
              
The confidence that 
the investments made 
in the relationship 
today will pay off 
over the long run 
serves as a strong 
incentive for both 
firms to cooperate. 
              
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In the relationship with ALPHA, both organizations have...Each organization... 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Each organization 
monitors its own 
investment of 
financial resources 
into the relationship, 
to ensure it meets the 
expectations of its 
partner. 
              
Each organization 
monitors the level of 
personnel resources it 
invests into the 
relationship, to ensure 
it meets the 
expectations of its 
partner. 
              
Each organization 
measures its own 
intention to make 
future investments in 
the relationship, to 
ensure it meets the 
expectations of its 
partner. 
              
 
116 
 
 
In this relationship, it is expected that... 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Our shared 
expectations serve to 
enforce our business 
agreements. 
              
The strength of our 
relationship will keep 
the parties honest in 
dealing with each 
other. 
              
We will work together 
to resolve any 
discrepancies that 
may arise. 
              
We will keep our 
promises to each other 
because we value our 
partnership. 
              
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Regarding your relationship with the ALPHA, to what extent do you agree with the following 
statements. 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
There are other 
retailers that could 
provide us with 
comparable 
distribution. 
              
Our total costs of 
switching to a 
competing retailer 
would be prohibitive. 
              
It would be difficult 
for us to replace the 
sales and profits 
ALPHA generates. 
              
We are very 
dependent on 
ALPHA. 
              
There are other 
suppliers who could 
provide ALPHA with 
product lines 
comparable to ours. 
              
ALPHA would incur 
prohibitive costs in 
replacing our firm 
with another supplier. 
              
It would be difficult 
for ALPHA to replace 
the sales and profits 
generated from our 
firm’s product line. 
              
ALPHA is very 
dependent on us.               
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Think back to when you FIRST read the letter from your focal retailer, ALPHA.  How believable 
is it that ALPHA would propose such an initiative? 
 Very Believable 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 Very Unbelievable 7 
 
How many months have you personally interacted with the retailer that we are referring to as 
ALPHA? 
 
Approximately, what  is the total annual sales revenue of your entire company/organization? 
 <$100,000 
 $100,000 to $500,000 
 $500,001 to $1,000,000 
 $1,000,001 to $5,000,000 
 $5,000,001 to $10,000,000 
 $10,000,001 to $50,000,000 
 $50,000,001 to $100,000,000 
 >$100,000,001 
 
What is your current title? 
 
How many MONTHS have you been in your current position? 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
What year were you born? 
 
That completes our study.  Thank you very much for your time. If you would like to receive a 
free executive summary of this study, please provide your email address in the space below. 
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